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Fleshing Out the Skeleton:
Defining the Prongs of Stern v. Marshall
Robert Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the action stem from the bankruptcy itself? Is the action nec-
essarily resolved by the claims allowance process? Following Stern v.
Marshall,' these two prongs form the disjunctive test for the constitu-
tional authority of bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments. How-
ever, beyond the explicit answers provided by Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.2 and Stern (the Constitu-
tional Adjudication Case Line), the boundaries of these two inquires
remain uncertain more than a year after Stern was decided. One issue
that Stern made clear is that state-law-based 3 tort and contract claims
cannot be finally adjudicated if they are not completely adjudicated in
the process of ruling on the creditor's proof of claim.4
The preeminent issue surrounding Stern is whether its holding
should be applied to only state-law-based counterclaims existing
outside of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) 5 or whether it should be
* Law clerk to Honorable William L. Stocks, United States Bankruptcy Judge Middle District
of North Carolina. This Article reflects solely the author's views. I would like to thank the
editorial board of the DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal for its help in editing this
Article, any mistakes are my own. I would also like to thank Susan Miller and Alexandra Dugan
for their love and support.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
2. See 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
3. Courts often use loose wording by employing state law to signify "all nonbankruptcy law
that creates substantive claims." Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n.9 (1991) (using the
term's "expansive" definition of state law). Even Stern and Marathon alternate between the
terms "state-law-based" and "common-law-based" actions. The correct term would probably be
best defined negatively-as an action that does not stem from the bankruptcy itself. In positive
terms, this would encompass actions based on state law, actions based on federal nonbankruptcy
law, and bankruptcy actions that can be reclassified as common-law actions.
4. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615 ("Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to
adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising
under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review
. . . . Substitute 'tort' for 'contract,' and that statement directly covers this case." (citations
omitted)).
5. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1532 (West 2012).
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applied more broadly.6 As analyzed by many courts, including the
Ninth Circuit and Professor Brubaker, it appears Stern imported the
case line analyzing the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial7 (the
Seventh Amendment Case Line) into the analysis of the constitutional
boundaries of Article I bankruptcy power.8 This Article assumes that
the Constitutional Adjudication Case Line embraces the Seventh
Amendment Case Line as precedent for the Article III right to adjudi-
cate inquiry. In attempting to define the boundaries of the two prongs
of the Stern test, this Article uses post-Stern opinions whenever possi-
ble. When necessary, it resorts to using the Seventh Amendment
Case Line and other cases construing the right to a jury trial to help
define the prongs of the Stern test.
This Article does not wholly subscribe to Brubaker's other conclu-
sion that the Constitutional Adjudication Case Line reconstitutional-
ized the summary/plenary dichotomy. In at least three examples-(1)
the liquidation of nondischargeable debts, (2) § 502 claims allowance,
and (3) turnover-this argument is particularly vulnerable. The sum-
mary/plenary dichotomy possesses the force of tradition, "if for no
other reason than it went without constitutional challenge for so long
under the [Bankruptcy Act of 1898]" (the 1898 Act). 9 The traditional
argument10 rings particularly hollow for late additions to the 1898 Act
6. Compare Black, Davis, & Shue Agency, Inc. v. Frontier Ins. Co. in Rehab. (In re Black,
Davis, & Shue Agency, Inc.), 471 B.R. 381, 400-01 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012) (suggesting that the
narrow view applies Stern to core claims under § 157 and the broad view applies it to any "claims
that arise outside the Bankruptcy Code"), with Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contrac-
tors, LLC), 462 B.R. 901, 907-08 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (suggesting that the narrow view of
Stern applies its test only to state-law-based counterclaims while the broad view applies it to
other actions including fraudulent conveyances). This Article does not characterize Stern's hold-
ing by comparing the narrow view against the broad view. As with many things regarding Stern,
the characterization of the scope of its holding is messy.
7. Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990) (per curiam); Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Schoenthal v. Irving Trust
Co., 287 U.S. 92 (1932).
8. E.g., Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d
553, 563 (9th Cir. 2012); Weisfelner v. Blavatnik (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 467 B.R. 712,
721-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (asserting that Stern incorporates the Seventh Amendment Case Line);
see also Ralph Brubaker, A "Summary" Statutory and Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy
Judges' Core Jurisdiction after Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121,155 (2012) [hereinafter
Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory]. Compare Moyer v. Koloseik (In re Sutton), 470
B.R. 462, 468-69 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012) (suggesting courts apply the Chief Justice's analysis
to other parts of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)), with Tanguy v. West (In re Davis), No. 07-33986-H3-7, 2012
WL 2871662, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 10, 2012) (finding that Stern does not apply as precedent to the
jury trial issue).
9. Meoli v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp.), 456 B.R. 318, 325 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2011).
10. The power of tradition itself, as a reason for constitutionality, is questionable. Compare
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1977) (noting that tradition itself is not sufficient to
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such as the discharge amendments enacted in 1970 (the Discharge
Amendments), less than ten years before the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 (the Reform Act) that ended the application of the summary/
plenary dichotomy. The boundaries of the claims allowance process
have always been set by statute and expanded or contracted at the will
of the sovereign. The limits of the claims allowance process used pur-
suant to the 1898 Act do not hamper Congress's power to alter them
today. Moreover, Stern explicitly found the claims allowance process
to be part of the Article I bankruptcy power. Lastly, the test for turn-
over employed by the 1898 Act does not implicate the Article III con-
cerns of the Constitutional Adjudication Case Line. A different test
should be applied to decide whether a bankruptcy court can constitu-
tionally adjudicate a turnover action. In summary, the better view is
that "[t]he historical understanding of the plenary/summary distinc-
tion informs, but does not dictate" whether a bankruptcy court can
constitutionally adjudicate an action.1'
This Article has five parts. First, it provides a historical overview of
both bankruptcy courts' constitutional power to enter final judgments
(Constitutional Power) and the relevant impact of the Seventh
Amendment on that power. Many prior works have analyzed the
facts of Stern, the Seventh Amendment Case Line, and the Supreme
Court cases analyzing the public rights exception. 12 Hence, this part
focuses on cases and sources hitherto overlooked, or at least under-
analyzed. In the next two parts, this Article considers the meaning of
the two prongs of Stern: (1) necessarily resolved by the claims allow-
ance process and (2) stems from the bankruptcy itself. It does not
provide a handy list of every conceivable application of these inquiries
in bankruptcy.13 Instead, it considers some of the techniques used to
invoke or deflect Stern and their application to different causes of ac-
sustain jurisdiction), with Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (noting
that tradition is vital, if not sufficient, to sustain jurisdiction).
11. West v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P.), 465 B.R. 452,
462 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
12. E.g., Alan M. Ahart, A Stern Reminder that the Bankruptcy Court Is Not a Court of Eq-
uity, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 192 (2012); Douglas G.,Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86
AM. BANKR. L.J. 3, 4-5 (2012) (discussing the public rights exception in light of Stern); Christo-
pher S. Lockman, Makalidung's Post: How Stern v. Marshall Is Shaking Bankruptcy Court Juris-
diction to Its Core, 50 Duo. L. REV. 125, 152-54 (2012); Jolene Tanner, Comment, Stern v.
Marshall- The Earthquake that Hit the Bankruptcy Courts and the Aftershocks that Followed, 45
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 587, 590-93 (2012).
13. The possibilities are endless, as Stern "has become the mantra of every litigant who, for
strategic or tactical reasons, would rather litigate somewhere other than the bankruptcy court."
In re Ambac Fin. Grp., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). For an excellent summary of
the application of Stern, see Tyson A. Crist, Stern v. MarshalL* Application of the Supreme
Court's Landmark Decision in the Lower Courts, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 627 (2012).
2012] 3
4 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
tion by analyzing both post-Stern precedent and, when necessary, pre-
Stern Seventh Amendment cases. In the last part, it considers nondis-
chargeability suits and the constitutionality of bankruptcy courts'
power to liquidate a nondischargeable debt. Applying the lessons of
Katchen and Stern, courts should employ the dischargeability allow-
ance process when there are no assets in the estate. Similar to the
claims allowance process, if all factual and legal issues presented by
liquidating a nondischargeable debt will be decided by the bankruptcy
court's judgment on dischargeability, the bankruptcy court may con-
stitutionally adjudicate the liquidation of the nondischargeable debt.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS:
FINAL JUDGMENTS
This Part provides an overview of the Constitutional Power of bank-
ruptcy courts by proceeding chronologically in four stages. First, it
will consider the English bankruptcy regime at the time of the ratifica-
tion of the United States Constitution in 1789 through the Bankruptcy
Act of 1867 (the 1867 Act). Next, it will outline the 1898 Act, the first
permanent federal bankruptcy statute. It subsequently analyzes the
Reform Act and the Code, as well as the changes wrought by Mara-
thon. Lastly, it will consider the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA) and Stern.
A. The Common Law, the Founding, and the Early Acts
Article I of the Constitution empowers Congress to establish uni-
form federal bankruptcy laws and federal bankruptcy courts.14 On the
one hand, Congress may use its federal bankruptcy power to create
Article I bankruptcy courts staffed by bankruptcy judges who are not
required to receive the same benefits of life tenure and salary protec-
tion bestowed on Article III judges.1 5 On the other hand, Congress's
bankruptcy power is not boundless because an Article III judge must
preside over "the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried
by the courts at Westminster in 1789."16 The independence provided
by the retention and pay protection of Article III is an important but-
tress against either the legislative or the executive branch's attempt to
14. Congress has the power "[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States" and "[to constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme [sic]
Court." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 9.
15. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011).
16. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
[Vol. 11:1
2012] FLESHING OUT THE SKELETON 5
disrupt the separation of powers.17 When questions of adjudication
arise over whether an Article I bankruptcy judge or an Article III
district judge is sufficient, Article III supervision is presumed to be
necessary.18
Even though "[b]ankruptcy jurisdiction, as understood today and at
the time of the framing, is principally in rem jurisdiction . . . [t]he
Framers would have understood that laws on the subject of Bankrupt-
cies included laws providing, in certain limited respects, for more than
simple adjudications of rights in the res." 19 Deciphering how far the
Constitutional Power of bankruptcy courts extends beyond "simple
adjudications of rights in the res" has proven to be a difficult task.20
The importance of the unsatisfactory English system of bankruptcy
used in 178921 stems from the requirement of the Constitutional Adju-
dication Case Line that an Article III court adjudicate actions that
were "the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the
courts at Westminster in 1789."22 The significance of this archaic
framework is magnified by the technique of looking beneath a cause
of action to potentially reclassify it as outside the realm of bankruptcy
court final adjudication. This technique will be considered in Part
V(B). In 1789, English bankruptcy jurisdiction concerned the prop-
erty of the bankrupt; succinctly summarized, it was in rem.2 3 The
bankruptcy commissioners, appointed by the Lord Chancellor, "took
the bankrupt's property, assigned it, and distributed the proceeds to
17. Id. at 57-60, 60 n.10.
18. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618 (citing Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 70 n.23).
19. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 369-70 (2006) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
20. Cf id. at 370, 372 ("Whatever the appropriate appellation, those who crafted the Bank-
ruptcy Clause would have understood it to give Congress the power to authorize courts to avoid
preferential transfers and to recover the transferred property.").
21. Contemporaneous sources described the system as slow, expensive, nonuniform, and cor-
rupt. John C. McCoid, II, Right to Jury Trial in Bankruptcy: Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 15, 31 (1991).
22. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring)). In his concurrence in Stem, Justice Scalia also sought to limit Article I adjudica-
tory power to "firmly established historical practice." Id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Kent L. Richland, Stern v. Marshall- A Dead-End Marathon?, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 393,
415 (2012). Whether such a category would include actions that could be summarily adjudicated
under the 1898 Act or instead would revert to the notions of bankruptcy jurisdiction employed at
the time of the founding is unclear; however, considering Justice Scalia's citation of Professor
Plank's article that analyzes English bankruptcy practice at the time of the founding and Ameri-
can bankruptcy practice under the 1800 Act, it would appear that those would be relevant areas
of inquiry. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Thomas E. Plank, Why
Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567,
607-09 (1998)).
23. Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 123.
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the creditors who had proved their claims."24 The commissioner's ju-
risdiction did not extend to deciding what constituted the bankruptcy
estate.25 Counterclaims by the estate and avoidance of preferences
and fraudulent transfers were among the proceedings outside of the
commissioner's jurisdiction.26 The adjudication of what constituted
the bankruptcy estate required actions by the assignees in the courts
of law and equity.27 The early American bankruptcy statutes em-
ployed this bifurcation of bankruptcy jurisdiction.28
Unfortunately, little information can be gleaned from eighteenth
and nineteenth century practices as federal bankruptcy laws rarely ex-
isted. Although Congress enacted federal regimes following financial
disasters in 1800, 1841, and 1867, in each instance, it quickly repealed
the legislation.29 The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 (the 1800 Act) was
cribbed from the then-contemporary English bankruptcy statute.30
Bankruptcy commissioners, who were not Article III judges, adjudi-
cated proceedings under the 1800 Act.31 Decisions by the commis-
sioners were subject to review by Article III district court judges.32
Just like the earlier English procedure, the assignees to the debtor's
property, counterparts to contemporary trustees, prosecuted actions
against third parties in courts of law and equity. 33 Sadly for original-
ists, the Supreme Court's reliance on a case decided under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1841 (the 1841 Act) as authority for the 1800 Act's
interpretation illustrates the paucity of authority interpreting the 1800
Act.3 4 The 1841 Act vested jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings
with the district court. The proceedings were "in the nature of sum-
mary proceedings in equity."35 The 1867 Act implemented a system
24. McCoid, supra note 21, at 29.
25. Id. at 30.
26. See Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 123-24 (citing Halford
v. Gillow, 60 Eng. Rep. 18, 20 (Ch. 1842)); McCoid, supra note 21, at 30.
27. Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 123; McCoid, supra note
21, at 30-31; see Meoli v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp.), 456 B.R. 318, 327
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011). However, the commissioner made the initial determination that the
actions were property of the debtor. Plank, supra note 22, at 613.
28. See McCoid, supra note 21, at 33-36.
29. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 386 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR.
INsT. L. REv. 5, 13-14 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb, History]). See Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and
Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605,
631-32 (2008), for an interesting commentary on why enactments were so "spasmodic."
30. Lipson, supra note 29, at 633.
31. Plank, supra note 22, at 608.
32. Id. at 609.
33. Id. at 613.
34. Katz, 546 U.S. at 374 (citing In re Comstock, 6 F. Cas. 237, 239 (Vt. 1842)).
35. Tabb, History, supra note 29, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 11:1
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of adjudication similar to that later employed under the 1898 Act and
the Code. Although the district courts had original jurisdiction over
bankruptcy proceedings, they were empowered to appoint registers to
assist the district judges.36 These registers were the forerunners to the
later referees and bankruptcy judges.37 The 1867 Act authorized reg-
isters to take control of the debtor's property, adjudicate claims
against the property, and then distribute it.38 However, the registers
could not adjudicate any factual or legal objections, 39 and the exact
boundaries of their Constitutional Power were uncertain. 40
B. The 1898 Act
The 1898 Act was the first permanent national bankruptcy law,41
and it clarified the Constitutional Power of the newly created bank-
ruptcy referees. 42 Under the 1898 Act, the bankruptcy referees43 ex-
ercised summary jurisdiction over the assets of the debtor's estate
while the now defunct circuit courts, as well as the district courts, ex-
ercised plenary jurisdiction over adverse parties to the estate.44 Sum-
mary jurisdiction included adjudication of all claims against the
estate.45 Plenary jurisdiction arose over trustees' suits to recover
36. Id. at 19.
37. Id.
38. Melodie Freeman-Burney, Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984: Sum-
ming Up the Factors, 22 TULSA L.J. 167, 170 n.23 (1986); see also In re Bank of N.C., 2 F. Cas.
668, 669 (E.D.N.C. 1879).
39. Freeman-Burney, supra note 38, at 170 n.23; see also In re Bank of N.C, 2 F. Cas. at 669.
40. See In re Bank of N.C, 2 F. Cas. at 669.
41. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 386 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Similar to
the previous statutes, it was enacted in response to financial panics in 1884 and 1893. Tabb,
History, supra note 29, at 23. By vesting adjudicative power with the district courts, the 1841 Act
evaded the morass of issues presented by Article I adjudication. See id. at 17.
42. See Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General Statu-
tory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 743, 764-67 (2000) [hereinafter Bruba-
ker, Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction], for an in-depth consideration of the motivation for this
change. As a result of this tightening, "[tihe primary vice of the 1898 Act's jurisdictional regime
was that it engendered an excessive amount of preliminary litigation over jurisdictional issues
surrounding the bifurcation of bankruptcy jurisdiction." Id. at 792. Following Stern, we face the
same vice. George W. Kuney, Stern v. Marshall- A Likely Return to the Bankruptcy Act's Sum-
mary/Plenary Distinction in Article III Terms, 21 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 1 (2012) (suggesting a
congressional fix is necessary to forestall "[d]ecades of [Ilitigation").
43. This title originated from the process used by district courts to send or refer cases to the
bankruptcy courts. Leslie R. Masterson, Waiving the Right to a Jury: Claims, Counterclaims, and
Informal Claims, 85 Am. BANKR. L.J. 91, 97 (2011). Ironically, the registers of the 1867 Act were
also referred cases by the district court. E.g., In re Bank of N.C., 2 F. Cas. at 669.
44. E.g., In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., 466 B.R. 750, 762 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012).
45. Thus, the bankruptcy referee's jurisdiction was basically in rem. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 97 (1982) (White, J., dissenting).
2012] 7
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property or money from third parties who had not filed a claim.4 6
Summary proceedings were adjudicated without a jury trial while the
right to a jury trial attached to plenary proceedings. 47 Summary juris-
diction encompassed three types of matters: (1) "administrative mat-
ters," (2) "matters where the court had actual or constructive
possession of a res," and (3) "matters where the parties consented." 48
Consent proved the most thorny and ambiguous of the three types,
and it has remained troublesome.49 Express and implied consent re-
main important ways to obtain jurisdiction, even when jurisdiction
would not otherwise be proper.50 In Stern, for instance, Pierce Mar-
shall consented to the bankruptcy court's adjudication of his defama-
tion claim by his failure to object and his comments illustrating his
contentment with litigating his claim in bankruptcy court, even though
the bankruptcy court may not have had statutory jurisdiction over
such an action.5' Under the 1898 Act, express consent of a litigant
could waive the right to a plenary proceeding and allow a referee to
46. Ralph Brubaker, Article III's Bleak House (Part I): The Statutory Limits of Bankruptcy
Judges' Core Jurisdiction, 31 No. 8 BANKR. L. LETTER 1, 7 (2011) [hereinafter Brubaker, Article
III's Bleak House]; see Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1932). This descrip-
tion overstates the clarity between summary and plenary. For example, the division between a
trustee holding a colorable claim to property that can then be adjudicated summarily and a
stranger to the estate holding a substantial right to property claim by the estate that must be
plenarily adjudicated is blurry. Compare May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111, 115 (1925) (noting
that the trustee's colorable claim to property held by a stranger to the estate allowed a summary
proceeding), with Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191, 194-95 (1926) (noting that the trustee
must resort to a plenary proceeding when a stranger possessed a substantial right to the property
claimed by the estate).
47. Brubaker, Article III's Bleak House, supra note 46, at 10.
48. Ronald R. Peterson, Stern v. Marshall Bleak House Revisited, 27 NABT-TALK 10, 12
(2011).
49. Compare Hagan v. Classic Prods. Corp. (In re Wilderness Crossings, LLC), No. 09-14547,
2011 WL 5417098, at *4 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2011) (finding that a defaulting defendant
consented to bankruptcy court adjudication of a claim, which the court noted was questionable
under Stern), with Moyer v. Koloseik (In re Sutton), 470 B.R. 462, 474-76 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
2012) (disagreeing with In re Wilderness Crossings and finding that a defaulting defendant had
not consented to bankruptcy court adjudication of a turnover action that the court found the
bankruptcy court could not adjudicate pursuant to Stern).
50. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2607-08 (2011). Whether consent of the litigants is
sufficient to allow Article I adjudication of an action that otherwise requires Article III adjudica-
tion is questionable. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986); Richland, supra note 22, at 415. However, bankruptcy courts have found consent suffi-
cient to allow bankruptcy court final adjudication of a core but precluded claim. See, e.g., Pen-
son Fin. Servs., Inc. v. O'Connell (In re Arbco Capital Mgmt., LLP), 479 B.R. 254, 262 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (listing cases); Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 462 B.R.
457, 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
51. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2606-08, 2607 n.4.
[Vol. 11:1
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make a summary adjudication.52 Following Stern, a split between two
courts of appeals has arisen over the ability of a litigant to consent to a
bankruptcy court's final adjudication of an action that a bankruptcy
court could not otherwise finally decide. 53 The Sixth Circuit explained
that the right to an Article III adjudication is both a personal right of
the litigant and a structural principle of protecting the separation of
power between the three branches of government.54 Because "the en-
croachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other"55 is implicated by Stern, the court found that the structural
principle predominates, and a litigant cannot waive the structural
principle of Article III adjudication. 56 In contrast, the vast majority of
other courts, including the Ninth Circuit, has determined that the per-
sonal right of the litigant predominates over the structural principle.57
The Ninth Circuit explained that "the allocation of authority between
bankruptcy courts and district courts does not implicate structural in-
terests, because bankruptcy judges are officer[s] of the district court
and are appointed by the Courts of Appeals."58
During the 1898 Act, implied consent derived from "a voluntary
assertion of a claim by an adverse claimant" against estate property
and it "had a peculiarly erratic history." 59 Early cases found that cred-
itors who filed a proof of claim had not implicitly consented to bank-
ruptcy court adjudication of counterclaims for affirmative relief by a
52. MacDonald v. Plymouth Cnty. Trust Co., 286 U.S. 263, 267 (1932); Consent to Summary
Jurisdiction, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 471 (1966), available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edulflrl
vol34/iss3/7.
53. Compare Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 2012), with Exec. Benefits Ins.
Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 567 (9th Cir. 2012).
54. Waldman, 698 F.3d at 918.
55. Id. (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 850) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. The results of an inability to consent are concerning. Not only will it further increase
the workload of Article III courts, but also it could "give litigants a basis to challenge, by recon-
sideration or appeal, the finality, and therefore the enforceability, of bankruptcy court deci-
sions." Crist, supra note 13, at 650.
57. In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d at 567 n.9; see also Men's Sportswear, Inc. v.
Sasson Jeans, Inc. (In re Men's Sportswear, Inc.), 834 F.2d 1134, 1138 (2d Cir. 1987); Exec.
Sounding Bd. Assocs. Inc. v. Advanced Mach. & Eng'g Co. (In re Oldco M Corp.), No. 09-13412
(MG), 2012 WL 6625324, at *5-6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2012).
58. In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d at 567 n.9 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West
2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This area has already been the subject of significant
learned scholarship and is outside the central scope of this Article. See Ralph Brubaker, The
Constitutionality of Litigant Consent to Non-Article III Bankruptcy Adjudication, 32 No. 12
BANKR. LAw LET-ER 1, 5-14 (2012) [hereinafter Brubaker, Litigant Consent]; Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern v. Marshall (Nov. 27, 2011), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1965604.
59. Consent to Summary Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at 471.
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trustee. 60 This trend changed when the Supreme Court in Alexander
v. Hillman allowed an equity receivership to obtain summary jurisdic-
tion over counterclaims against creditors.61 Analogizing bankruptcy
trustees to receivers, 62 courts in the mid-twentieth century found that
the filing of a proof of claim constituted implied consent to summary
jurisdiction of compulsory and even permissive counterclaims by the
trustee.63 However, Katchen shifted the focus of the analysis from the
consent of the creditor to the bankruptcy court's duty to adjudicate
claims.64 The touchstone became the degree of overlap between the
trustee's claim and the adjudication of the creditor's proof of claim. 65
Although the Supreme Court has embraced implied consent as a
basis for Article I adjudication by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), the filing of a proof of claim does not constitute
consent to bankruptcy court adjudication. In Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Schor, the Supreme Court embraced a version
of implied consent similar to that employed before Katchen to allow
adjudication of a common-law counterclaim by the CFTC.6 6 How-
ever, the defendant to the counterclaim in Schor was the original
plaintiff and had possessed the option to pursue a case in federal dis-
60. Id. at 473. A subcategory of cases limited jurisdiction by the amount of a counterclaim
compared to the proof of claim. Note, In the Matter of Counterclaims in Bankruptcy: Summary
Procedure and the Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Referee, 65 YALE L.J. 694, 696 n.11 (1956). As
long as the counterclaim did not outstrip the creditor's claim it could be summarily adjudicated
in bankruptcy court. Id. at 694-95.
61. 296 U.S. 222, 238 (1935).
62. "[S]everal courts seized upon Hillman to extend the summary jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts." William J. Rochelle, Jr. & John L. King, Summary Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy: Katchen
v. Landy and Questions Left Unanswered, 1966 DUKE L.J. 669, 676, available at http://scholar
ship.law.duke.edu/dlj/voll5/iss3/2.
63. Courts initially distinguished between compulsory and permissive counterclaims. See,
e.g., In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 200 F.2d 327, 333 (3d Cir. 1952). Most bankruptcy courts were
unwilling to summarily adjudicate a permissive counterclaim. See, e.g., id. at 333. Prior to
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), only the Tenth Circuit expressly allowed summary juris-
diction over permissive counterclaims. Consent to Summary Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at 479
(citing Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 810,
cert. dismissed, 350 U.S. 944 (1956)). But see Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2617 (2011)
(noting that even a debtor's compulsory counterclaim does not automatically create constitu-
tional jurisdiction).
64. See Katchen, 382 U.S. at 332 n.9; Consent to Summary Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at
479-80 (expressing surprise that Katchen did not rely on implied consent arising from filing a
proof of claim); Rochelle & King, supra note 62, at 680 (noting that Katchen failed to rely on the
consent theory).
65. See Katchen, 382 U.S. at 333-34 (explaining that if a bankruptcy court must decide a coun-
terclaim against a creditor who has filed a proof of claim as part of allowing the creditor's claim,
then findings would be res judicata for the purposes of later plenary proceedings brought by the
debtor on the basis of the counterclaim); see also Schwartz v. Levine & Malin, Inc. (In re Kel-
ner), 111 F.2d 81, 82 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam).
66. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-57 (1986).
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trict court.6 7 In bankruptcy, once the § 362(a) automatic stay arises,
an unsecured creditor faces a Hobson's choice of either participating
in the bankruptcy by filing a proof of claim or receiving nothing from
the distribution of the debtor's estate. 68 Because a creditor filing a
proof of claim in bankruptcy cannot choose to pursue the debt else-
where, both Granfinanciera and Stern rejected that filing a proof claim
constituted implied consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of an es-
tate's counterclaim. 69
C. The Reform Act, Marathon, and the BAFJA
In 1978, the Reform Act enacted the Code and restructured bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction to eliminate the distinction between summary and
plenary proceedings. 70 The renamed bankruptcy judges7' were vested
with all the "powers of . . . equity, law, and admiralty." 72 Hence,
bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising
under . . . or arising in or related to cases under [the Code]."73 Al-
though the Reform Act granted bankruptcy judges with jurisdiction
similar to Article III judges, it bestowed neither the title of Article III
judges nor their salary protection and life tenure. 74
Marathon found that the bankruptcy courts' enlarged Constitu-
tional Power under the Reform Act violated Article III by granting
too much adjudicatory power to an Article I court.75 Although they
disagreed on the scope of the public rights exception, both the plural-
ity and Justice Rehnquist's concurrence found that a state-law-based
67. But see Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 ("Pierce did not truly consent to resolution of Vickie's
claim in the bankruptcy court proceedings. He had nowhere else to go if he wished to recover
from Vickie's estate.").
68. Id. at 2615 n.8 (explaining how creditors "have no choice but to file their claims in bank-
ruptcy proceedings if they want to pursue the claims at all"); Masterson, supra note 43, at 91
(explaining the interesting origins of Hobson's choice and how a creditor "must either refrain
from filing proofs of claims, thereby preserving their jury rights but foregoing any distribution
from the estate, or file proofs of claim, thereby retaining their rights against the estate but losing
their entitlement to a jury." (quoting In re Hooker Invs., Inc., 122 BR. 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
69. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614; Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 59 n.14 (1989).
70. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54 (1982).
71. They were actually renamed earlier as part of the Bankruptcy Rules promulgated on Oc-
tober 1, 1973. See Peter F. Coogan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Questions for the
Non-Bankruptcy Business Lawyer, 29 Bus. LAw. 729, 729 n.2 (1974).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) (repealed 1984). "This jurisdictional grant empowers bankruptcy
courts to entertain a wide variety of cases involving ... claims based on state law as well as those
based on federal law." Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 54.
73. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 85 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (Supp. IV 1976))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
74. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1; Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609.
75. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 87.
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contract action did not fall within the exception.76 They further
agreed that bankruptcy courts were not adjuncts to the district
courts.7 7 Justice Rehnquist's concurrence added that an Article III
judge must adjudicate proceedings consisting of "the stuff of the
traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster
in 1789" brought within federal court jurisdiction.78 Although subse-
quent courts have wrestled with whether the plurality or Justice Rehn-
quist's concurrence represented the holding of Marathon,79 Stern
applies both as precedent80 but focuses more on the public rights
exception.81
Following Marathon, the Supreme Court stayed its ruling and Con-
gress eventually enacted BAFJA82 to repeal all the bankruptcy juris-
diction provisions of the Reform Act.8 3 BAFJA "established the
current bankruptcy jurisdictional scheme." 84 Bankruptcy judges be-
76. See id. at 67-68, 90-91.
77. See id. at 71-72, 81-86, noted in Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2610 ("A full majority of Justices
in Northern Pipeline also rejected the debtor's argument that the bankruptcy court's exercise of
jurisdiction was constitutional because the bankruptcy judge was acting merely as an adjunct of
the district court or court of appeals."). But see Meoli v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Teleser-
vices Grp.), 456 B.R. 318, 328 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (insisting that room still exists, "even
after Stern to consider further the appellant's argument in Northern Pipeline that a bankruptcy
court can still enter at least some orders as if it were an independent legislative court").
78. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 90.
79. See Jason C. Matson, Running Circles Around Marathon? The Effect of Accounts Receiva-
ble as Core or Noncore Proceedings on the Article III Courts, 20 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 451,
492-93 (2004) ("Almost every court maintaining accounts receivable are noncore inevitably cite
to Marathon. Some of these courts rely on the plurality opinion by Justice Brennan to hold that
accounts receivable are private rights, and therefore, Congress could not delegate authority to
the bankruptcy court to conclude that an accounts receivable is a core proceeding. The other
courts rely on Justice Rehnquist's state law rights test in determining that accounts receivable
are state law claims, and therefore, bankruptcy courts cannot treat accounts receivable as core
proceedings.").
80. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 ("When a suit is made of the stuff of the traditional actions at
common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789, . .. and is brought within the bounds of
federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests with Article III judges in Article
III courts." (quoting Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 90) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); id at 2609-11 (analyzing Marathon Pipe Line's plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 2609-11. At different points during the legislative process, which resulted in the
Reform Act, drafts did include providing bankruptcy judges with Article III protections. See
Susan Block-Lieb, What Congress Had to Say: Legislative History as a Rehearsal of Congres-
sional Response to Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 71 (2012).
82. See Massachusetts v. Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc., 726 F.2d 26, 28-30 (1st Cir.
1984), for a timeline of the events occurring post-Marathon but pre-BAFJA and a discussion of
the confusion wrought. See also Masterson, supra note 43, at 103-04.
83. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333. For a thorough consideration of BAFJA and the legislative process creating it, see L.T.
Ruth Coal Co. v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co. (In re L.T. Ruth Coal Co.), 66 B.R. 753, 758-74
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1986).
84. In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., 466 B.R. 750, 764 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012).
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came "judicial officers of the United States district court."85 In con-
trast to the Reform Act, BAFJA granted the district courts original
jurisdiction for all cases arising under, arising in, or related to the
Code.86 District court judges are authorized to refer any and all cases
and proceedings under the Code to the bankruptcy courts of their dis-
trict.8 7 Bankruptcy judges, however, are not free to enter final judg-
ments on all cases or proceedings referred by the district courts.88
Preliminarily, the proceeding must "relate to" or have some conceiva-
ble effect on the bankruptcy case. 89 Moreover, the statutory ability to
enter a final judgment depends on the core-noncore distinction.
Bankruptcy courts may enter final judgments in core proceedings aris-
ing in or under the Code.90 Section 157(b)(2) of Title 28 provides a
non-exhaustive list of examples of core proceedings.91 The list in-
cludes counterclaims by the estate against individuals filing proofs of
claims, fraudulent conveyance proceedings, and turnover orders.92
When confronted with a noncore proceeding, a bankruptcy judge
"submit[s] proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the dis-
trict court."9 3 Although bankruptcy judges have less adjudicatory au-
thority than they had under the Reform Act, BAFJA still augmented
their authority when compared to the summary/plenary dichotomy
applied by the 1898 Act.94 Prior to Stern, most courts did not question
the constitutionality of BAFJA.95
D. Stern v. Marshall
The landscape of bankruptcy courts' Constitutional Power shifted
on June 23, 2011, when the Supreme Court decided Stern. The facts of
Stern are interesting and could produce an article or perhaps a book
85. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2006).
86. Id. § 1334(b).
87. Id. § 157(a).
88. New Horizon of N.Y. LLC v. Jacobs, 231 F.3d 143, 150 (4th Cir. 2000).
89. See, e.g., id. at 155; Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1987); Pacor,
Inc. v. Higgins (In re Pacor, Inc.), 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984). Conversely, if a proceeding is
not related, the bankruptcy court does not have any jurisdiction over the proceeding. § 1334(b).
90. § 157(b)(1). For a discussion of the history of § 157, see Arnold Print Works, Inc. v. Apkin
(In re Arnold Print Works, Inc.), 815 F.2d 165, 166-67 (1st Cir. 1987).
91. § 157(b)(2).
92. Id. § 157(b)(2)(C), (E), (H).
93. Id. § 157(c)(1).
94. Meoli v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp.), 456 B.R. 318, 325 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2011).
95. In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., 466 B.R. 750, 766 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012). But
see L.T. Ruth Coal Co. v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co. (In re L.T. Ruth Coal Co.), 66 B.R. 753,
796 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1986) ("This court is unable to find any case law or logic to support the
conclusion that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) is consistent with Article III of the Constitution.").
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themselves. 96 Boiled down, the central question was whether the
bankruptcy court could enter a final judgment on the estate's counter-
claim for tortious interference with an expected gift following the
creditor's filing of a proof of claim, which included a claim for defama-
tion.97 The Supreme Court found that the trustee's state-law-based
counterclaim existed independently of federal bankruptcy law and
would not be resolved as part of the claims allowance process. 98
Therefore, final judgment could not be entered by a non-Article III
court and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) could not constitutionally bestow adjudi-
catory authority on a bankruptcy court.99
Stressing a point first recited in Marathon, Stern found that Article I
bankruptcy courts cannot enter final judgments in nonbankruptcy
matters based on the common law or state law. 00 Thus, "Congress
may not withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its
nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or
admiralty."' 0' State-law-created rights-such as the contract action in
Marathon or the tort action in Stern-are private rights and do not fall
within the public rights exception discussed below in Part V(A).102
Lastly, the Court was unmoved by the pleas of the dissenters and
Vickie Marshall that the case would unbalance the division of work
between bankruptcy courts and district courts, as well as inject signifi-
96. For a discussion of the facts and procedural posture of Stern, see In re Safety Harbor
Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 707-10 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
97. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011). The defendant's tort claim dealt with a
separate issue of bankruptcy court jurisdiction: jurisdiction over personal injury tort claims. See
§ 157(b)(2)(0), (b)(5). However, the defendant's constructive and actual consent allowed the
Court to save clarification of this issue for another day. In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456
B.R. at 707-10.
98. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618.
99. See id. at 2618-20.
100. In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., 466 B.R. at 767 (citing Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609).
101. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
272, 284 (1855)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.25 (1982) (plurality opinion) (noting that the dissent agrees that
Congress is the best body to determine whether there is a need for federal independent courts).
102. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615; see Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1932)
("Suits to recover preferences constitute no part of the proceedings in bankruptcy but concern
controversies arising out of it . . . They may be brought in the state courts as well as in the
bankruptcy courts."). This result was somewhat surprising considering two recent cases had ex-
panded the public rights doctrine. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 854 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985). However,
the Court's subsequent discussion of public rights in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S.
33 (1989), signaled another possible path. S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials and Core Proceed-
ings: The Bankruptcy Judge's Uncertain Authority, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 174 (1991) ("The
fate of core jurisdiction thus may hinge on which line of authority the Supreme Court decides to
follow."); see also Alec P. Ostrow, Constitutionality of Core Jurisdiction, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 91,
95-96 (1994).
2012] FLESHING OUT THE SKELETON 15
cant uncertainty into the adjudicatory framework for bankruptcy
proceedings. 103
Stern created a two-prong test to decide whether a bankruptcy court
has Constitutional Power over a core proceeding 04: "whether the ac-
tion at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be
resolved in the claims allowance process."105 The test is disjunctive.
If either prong is met, the bankruptcy court may enter a final judg-
ment on that specific action.106 If neither prong is satisfied, the bank-
ruptcy court may only submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court. 107 This last assertion was more
tenuous in the months immediately following Stern as courts were
confronted with formulating a procedure for adjudicating proceedings
that fell within the list of core proceedings but could not be adjudi-
cated due to Stern. No provision was made for dealing with these
"core but precluded" 08 proceedings.109 Although bankruptcy courts
have unanimously adopted the practice of submitting proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,"i0 the Ninth
Circuit recently became the first circuit to recognize it."'
103. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618-20.
104. The Stern test is applied only to core proceedings. Schafer v. Nextiraone Fed., LLC, No.
1:12cv289, 2012 WL 2281828, at *5 (M.D.N.C. June 18, 2012).
105. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618.
106. Id.
107. Paloian v. Am. Express Co. (In re Canopy Fin., Inc.), 464 B.R. 770, 774 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(noting that even though a bankruptcy court could not enter final judgment on a core claim, the
district court was unwilling to "leav[e] [the proceedings] to occupy a virtual 'no man's land' on
the statutory landscape" but not let the bankruptcy court treat the proceeding like a noncore
proceeding). This proposition was disputed by at least one court in the early months following
Stern. See Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042, at *12 (Bankr.
D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011) (holding that a bankruptcy court could not issue proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law because the court lacked jurisdiction over a core but unconstitutionally
justiciable action), amended by 463 B.R. 896 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2012).
108. See Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 186 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(coining the term "core but precluded").
109. In re Blixseth, 2011 WL 3274042, at *12 ("Unlike in non-core proceedings, a bankruptcy
court has no statutory authority to render findings of fact and conclusions of law for core pro-
ceedings that it may not constitutionally hear.").
110. Courts have subsequently found that bankruptcy courts may constitutionally provide
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for core claims that cannot be constitutionally
adjudicated. See Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 469 B.R. 11, 19-20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (listing
cases). Moreover, the bankruptcy court for the District of Montana has responded to criticism
by modifying its holding to allow for proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See In re
Blixseth, 463 B.R. 896.
111. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553,
565-67 (9th Cir. 2012). Although the Seventh Circuit appeared uncomfortable with allowing a
bankruptcy court to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for a core but pre-
cluded proceeding, Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906, 915 (7th Cir.
2011), it did refer the case back to the bankruptcy court without instructions to do nothing which
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111. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS:
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings has a long and varied history.112 The Seventh Amendment
provides, "[i]n Suits at common law,... the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved."11 3 The goal of the Seventh Amendment is "to preserve
the right to [a] jury trial as it existed in 1791" and to apply that right to
actions analogous to those decided in the English law courts at the
time of the Constitution's ratification.114 The right to a jury trial at-
taches unless Congress constitutionally allows a non-Article III court
to adjudicate the proceeding without a jury. 15 When addressing
the Northern District of Illinois construed as tacit approval. See Gecker v. Flynn (In re Emerald
Casino, Inc.), 467 B.R. 128, 132-33 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2012). Prior to Stern, the Fifth Circuit
hinted that a core but precluded proceeding could be adjudicated by a bankruptcy court if it
were subject to de novo review by a district court and did not require a jury trial. Compare
McFarland v. Leyh (In re Tex. Gen. Petrol. Corp.), 52 F.3d 1330, 1337 (5th Cir. 1995) (hinting
that de novo review by a district court is sufficient to allow a bankruptcy court to adjudicate a
nonjury trial core but precluded action), with In re Clay, 35 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1994) (disap-
proving of a bankruptcy court conducting jury trials even when subject to de novo review). For
an interesting summary of the background of Texas General, which involved an original opinion
issued by the Court of Appeals that was subsequently withdrawn because it could not coexist
with Clay, see Leif M. Clark, Bankruptcy, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 533, 539-40 (1996).
112. Much ink has been spilled analyzing whether the right to a jury trial attaches in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, both generally and in core proceedings. See, e.g., Denise M. Barton, In re
Clay: The Fifth Circuit Denies Bankruptcy Courts the Power to Conduct Jury Trials Without
Consent of the Parties, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1703 (1995); Gibson, supra note 102, at 174 (explaining
inconsistent case law); G. Ray Warner, Katchen Up in Bankruptcy: The New Jury Trial Right, 63
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1989).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Supreme Court interprets the phrase "[sluits at common
law" to refer to "suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradis-
tinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were
administered." Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41 (1989) (quoting Parsons v.
Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 447 (1830)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 41 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974)).
115. Id. at 50. Much confusion still exists surrounding the scope of the bankruptcy courts'
power to conduct jury trials. A circuit split exists over whether a bankruptcy court may hold a
jury trial. Compare In re Clay, 35 F.3d at 194 (construing BAFJA as not empowering bankruptcy
judges to hold jury trials to avoid constitutional issue); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v.
Schwartzman (In re Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc.), 13 F.3d 122, 128 (4th Cir. 1993) (same); In re
Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1158 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); Rafoth v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. (In
re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc.), 954 F.2d 1169, 1173 (6th Cir. 1992) (relying on the BAFJA
argument only); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Frates (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 911 F.2d 380, 392 (10th
Cir. 1990) (construing BAFJA as not empowering bankruptcy judges to hold jury trials to avoid
constitutional issue); and In re United Mo. Bank of Kan. City, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449, 1456-57 (8th
Cir. 1990) (same), with Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d
1394, 1403-04 (2d Cir. 1990) (allowing bankruptcy courts to conduct jury trials), cert.
granted, 497 U.S. 1023, vacated and remanded, 498 U.S. 964, reinstated on remand, 924 F.2d 36
(2d Cir. 1991). Congress attempted to allow bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials in cases
where the district court designated the bankruptcy courts with that ability. 28 U.S.C. § 157(e)
(2006). Even following this express grant from Congress, many courts are unwilling to allow
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whether the right to a jury trial attaches to a cause of action, a three-
part test is applied.116 The first two steps are not part of the Stern
test.117 The third step mirrors the Stern test as the question is whether
the claim stems from the bankruptcy itself or is necessarily adjudi-
cated in the claims allowance process. 18 Analogous to Stern's gui-
dance regarding interpretation of the breadth of Article III
jurisdiction, the right to a jury trial "should be liberally construed."119
Although the two case lines have traditionally been compartmental-
ized, Stern's reliance on the Seventh Amendment Case Line has im-
ported this line into the Constitutional Adjudication Case Line. On a
cautionary note, the right to a jury trial is narrower than the right to
Article III adjudication because the right to a jury trial does not attach
to a core equitable action, but a core equitable action will still require
Article III adjudication if it does not satisfy either prong of the Stern
test.120 This Part will profile the four preeminent bankruptcy jury trial
cases decided by the Supreme Court, the Seventh Amendment Case
Line.
A. Schoenthal and Katchen
Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co. held that the right to a jury trial at-
tached to a counterclaim by an estate for preferential transfers against
bankruptcy courts to hold jury trials. See Barton, supra note 112, at 1715 n.89 (listing cases).
The power of bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials is distinct from deciding whether the right
to a jury trial attaches to an action that could be adjudicated in bankruptcy court. This Article
will focus on the latter inquiry.
116. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42.
117. The first part requires categorizing the action as either legal or equitable under the stan-
dards of English courts prior to the merger of law and equity courts. Id. The second part catego-
rizes whether the remedy sought is equitable or legal. Id. The second inquiry is more important.
Id. This distinction is helpful considering the "anemic explanatory power of the first inquiry."
In re Jensen, 946 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1991).
118. Although Granfinanciera did not use the language "stems from the bankruptcy itself," it
used the phrases "integral to the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations" and "integrally re-
lated to the reformation of debtor-creditor relations." Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58, 60. Con-
sidering the use of each of these phrases as a limitation prior to enumerating the limitation of the
claims allowance process, the author believes these three phrases all represent the same require-
ment. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011); Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58, 60; cf
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of N.C. Hosp. Ass'n Trust Fund v. Mem'l Mission Med. Ctr., Inc.
(In re N.C. Hosp. Ass'n Trust Fund), 112 B.R. 759, 762-63 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990) (applying the
two phrases in tandem for jury trial analysis). Sadly, the Supreme Court did not use either of the
latter two phrases in any case except Granfinanciera.
119. Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932).
120. See Ahart, supra note 12, at 195, 200; Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory,
supra note 8, at 151 n.135. Especially prior to Granfinanciera, many courts folded the considera-
tion of the Stern test into the first or second prong of the test. See Brubaker, Statutory and
Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 151 n.135.
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a third party. 121 The trustee sued the defendants to recover allegedly
preferential transfers of money made by the debtor.122 Because the
defendants had not filed a proof of claim, the claims allowance pro-
cess was not implicated.123 The Court found that preference actions
did not stem from the bankruptcy itself because they were not part of
bankruptcy proceedings at common law.124 Hence, the preferences
could not be summarily adjudicated by a bankruptcy referee without a
jury trial.125
In Katchen, the Supreme Court first used the claims allowance pro-
cess as a determinant of whether the right to a jury trial attaches to an
action.126 Unlike the defendants in Schoenthal, the defendant of the
trustee's preference action in Katchen filed a proof of claim against
the debtor's estate.127 Although plenary jurisdiction and the accom-
panying right to a jury trial attached to the preference avoidance ac-
tions,128 the filing of a proof of claim could vitiate that right.129 The
claims allowance process involved the bankruptcy referee's power to
allow and disallow claims: "an adjudication of interests claimed in a
res."130 By filing a proof of claim, the creditor sought relief through a
summary proceeding of the bankruptcy court.131 Section 57(g) of the
1898 Act extended bankruptcy courts' summary jurisdiction to disal-
low a defendant's proof of claim if the creditor was found liable for a
preference or fraudulent transfer, unless and until the amount of the
preference was paid to the estate.132 In short, when the adjudication
of the proof of claim required adjudication of the estate's counter-
claim, the filing of a proof of claim by the defendant converted the
action from one requiring a plenary proceeding with an accompanying
121. 287 U.S. at 96-97.
122. Id. at 93. Because the court did not discuss a filing of a proof of claim by the defendants,
we can assume that one was not filed and the claims allowance process was not implicated.
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 48.
123. This is not apparent from reading Schoenthal. However, both Katchen and
Granfinanciera explained that the Schoenthal defendant had not filed a proof of claim.
Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336 (1966)).
124. Schoenthal, 287 U.S. at 94 n.1, 95.
125. Id. at 96.
126. 382 U.S. 323.
127. Id. at 325.
128. This is certainly true when the action seeks the return of money. See Granfinanciera, 492
U.S. at 46 n.5; Schoenthal, 287 U.S. at 94-95. But see McCoid, supra note 21, at 23-28. If the
action were to seek recovery of a piece of real property, the availability of a plenary suit is more
questionable. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 46 n.5; Resolution Trust Corp. v. Pasquariello (In
re Pasquarielo), 16 F.3d 525, 530-31 (3d Cir. 1994).
129. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 333 n.9.
130. Id. at 329 (quoting Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947)).
131. Id. at 329-30.
132. Id. at 333-34; see infra Part IV(C)(1).
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right to a jury trial into one that could be summarily adjudicated by a
referee.133
B. Granfinanciera and Langenkamp
In the wake of Marathon and the enactment of BAFJA, the Su-
preme Court considered whether the right to a jury trial attached to a
fraudulent transfer proceeding in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg.134
In Granfinanciera, the defendant was sued by the trustee for receipt of
a fraudulent transfer from the debtor, but the defendant had not filed
a proof of claim against the debtor's estate. 35 BAFJA designated
fraudulent transfers as an example of core proceedings that a bank-
ruptcy court could finally adjudicate, presumably without a jury.136
Regardless, the right to a jury trial attached to the debtor's fraudulent
transfer action.137 In a discussion that would later be echoed with a
slightly different focus by Stern, the Court explained that statutory ju-
risdiction bestowed by § 157 of the Code does not overcome constitu-
tional deficiencies.138 Congress's categorization of a fraudulent
conveyance action as a core proceeding is not sufficient to bring it
within the embrace of the public rights doctrine and strip the com-
mon-law right to a jury trial.139 At bottom, a fraudulent conveyance
action is a suit "to augment the bankruptcy estate" and does not stem
from the bankruptcy itself.140 Additionally, the Court relied upon
both fraudulent transfer and preferential transfer cases.141 As a result,
the Court replicated the analysis used in Schoenthal, finding that the
right to a jury trial attached to the fraudulent transfer action against a
party who had not filed a proof of claim.142
In its latest bankruptcy jury trial decision, Langenkamp v. Culp, the
Supreme Court reconciled Katchen and Granfinanciera.143 When a
creditor files a proof of claim, "it triggers the process of allowance and
disallowance of claims, thereby subjecting [the creditor] to the bank-
133. See Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336.
134. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 33 (1989).
135. Id. at 36.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (2006); Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 50.
137. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 60-61.
138. Id. at 58-59, 60-61.
139. Id. at 61 ("Congress cannot eliminate a party's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
merely by relabeling the cause of action to which it attaches and placing exclusive jurisdiction in
an administrative agency or a specialized court of equity.").
140. See id. at 57-58.
141. See id. at 57-60.
142. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58-59.
143. See generally Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990) (per curiam).
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ruptcy court's equitable power." 144 This equitable power severed the
right to a jury trial on the trustee's preference action because the cred-
itor filed a proof of claim. 145 Stern dramatically increased the signifi-
cance of the Seventh Amendment Case Line by incorporating
relevant portions of its analysis as precedent for the Constitutional
Adjudication Case Line. 146
IV. THE CLAIMS ALLOWANCE PROCESS
The Constitutional Power of bankruptcy courts extends to actions
that will necessarily be resolved as part of the claims allowance pro-
cess, regardless of the consent of either a creditor or the estate. Al-
though the claims allowance process was first employed by Katchen,
its boundaries were only later explained in Stern. As a review of the
§ 502 claims allowance process, Bankruptcy Rule 3002(a) requires an
unsecured prepetition creditor to file a proof of claim to receive a
dividend from the estate.147 When a creditor files a proof of claim
pursuant to § 501(a), his claim must navigate the § 502 allowance pro-
cess, including § 502(d).148 The claims allowance process is implicated
by both the analyses of the Constitutional Power and the right to a
jury trial.149 Because the Supreme Court has used this analysis when
considering both Constitutional Power of bankruptcy courts and
whether the right to jury trial attaches in bankruptcy court, the claims
allowance process should have the same meaning in both analyses. 50
Moreover, pursuant to the canon of statutory interpretation of ratio
decidendi, when a reason is given for a case's decision"-a ratio
decidendi-it is authority in every other case in which that ratio
decidendi is applicable." 51 According to Stern, if an action against a
creditor who files a proof of claim must be decided as part of adjudi-
cating the creditor's proof of claim, the bankruptcy court's Constitu-
tional Power extends to the counterclaim as well as the proof of
claim.152 However, the claims allowance process has many wrinkles
beyond the process outlined in Stern.
144. Id. at 44 (quoting Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58-59, 59 n.14) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
145. Id. at 44-45.
146. See generally Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
147. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a).
148. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 501(a), 502(d) (2006).
149. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2617-18; Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329-30, 332-34 (1966).
150. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2617-18; Katchen, 382 U.S. at 329-30, 332-34.
151. E.g., United States v. Tyler, 466 F.2d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1972) (Duniway, J., concurring
and dissenting).
152. See generally Stern, 131 S. Ct. 2594.
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This Part will first explain the basic claims allowance process as out-
lined in Katchen and Stern. It will then turn to § 502(d), a subsection
at the center of Katchen that eases satisfaction of Stern's requirement
that all legal and factual issues must be adjudicated as part of ruling
on the defendant's proof of claim. Next, it analyzes whether a third
party's action setoff, reclamation, and recoupment are part of the
claims allowance process, even though they do not always require a
proof of claim. It then focuses on whether administrative expenses
should be part of the claims allowance process even though they are
allowed through a different process under a different subsection of the
Code. Further uncertainty exists over the application of § 502(d) to
administrative expenses. It then analyzes whether informal proofs of
claim fit within the claims allowance process. Lastly, it favors ex-
tending the claims allowance process to place the estate on equal foot-
ing with creditors.
A. Pre-1898 Act Illustrations
Bankruptcy proceedings "provide speedy proceedings, and the as-
certainment and adjustment of all claims and rights in favor of or
against the bankrupt's estate." 153 In Wiswall v. Campbell, Chief Jus-
tice Waite introduced the view that creditors paid a price for this swift-
ness and convenience as "a creditor who offers proof of his claim, and
demands its allowance, subjects himself to the dominion of the court,
and must abide the consequences." 154 The consequence and remedy
to which Wiswall alluded was the claims allowance process prescribed
by the 1867 Act. 55 Eighty years later, this view was known as "tradi-
tional" and citation was unnecessary.156 One hundred and thirty-five
years later, Stern still relied upon the same rationale.157
B. Katchen and Stern
Although Katchen coined the term "claims allowance process," 158
as Granfinanciera and Langenkamp recognized, the Supreme Court
did not explain the parameters of the term until Stern. Katchen relied
upon Wiswall's declaration that "he who invokes the aid of the bank-
ruptcy court by offering a proof of claim and demanding its allowance
153. Ex parte Christy, 44 U.S. (1 How.) 292, 314 (1845) (Story, J.).
154. Wiswall v. Campbell, 93 U.S. 347, 351 (1876).
155. Id. Wiswall gave a summary of the process at this point but also referred back to the
more detailed, section by section, explanation earlier in the opinion. See id at 349-51.
156. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947).
157. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2616 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 333 (1966)).
158. This phrase was originally known as the "process of allowance and disallowance of
claims." Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336.
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must abide the consequences of that procedure."' 59 It then ex-
pounded on the potential consequences, including summary adjudica-
tion of both objections to the proof of claim and actions for
affirmative relief, which would also be decided as part of adjudicating
the proof of claim.'60 The Court, however, "intimate[d] no opinion
concerning whether [the referee would have had] summary jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate a demand by the trustee for affirmative relief, all of
the substantial factual and legal bases for which ha[d] not been dis-
posed of in passing on objections to the [creditor's proof of] claim."161
Neither Granfinanciera nor Langenkamp analyzed the degree of over-
lap necessary for a counterclaim against a creditor to fit within the
claims allowance process.162 Faced with this ambiguity, some courts
viewed the filing of a proof of claim as sufficient to waive the right to a
jury trial regardless of the lack of factual or legal overlap. 63 In con-
trast, other courts found that an estate's counterclaim for affirmative
relief must be completely decided as part of adjudicating the creditor's
proof of claim to waive the litigant's right to a jury trial.'"
Stern finally explained that the boundaries of the claims allowance
process covered affirmative actions only if the action would necessa-
rily be decided as part of deciding the creditor's proof of claim.165 In
Stern, a factual overlap existed between deciding the creditor's proof
of claim, including his claim for defamation, and deciding the debtor's
counterclaim for tortious interference with an expected gift.166 The
overlap, however, was far from complete, as the Court would need to
decide at least two thorny legal issues that were present in only the
159. Id. at 333 n.9 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 337-38.
161. Id. at 333 n.9. As contemporary commentators observed, "[it is difficult to see any illu-
mination in the still dark area of non-57g counterclaims." Rochelle & King, supra note 62, at
680.
162. See Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P.A., 22 F.3d 1242, 1248 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[Katchen] did not further define the scope of the allowance and disallowance process.").
163. See, e.g., Bankr. Servs., Inc. v. Ernst & Young (In re CBI Holding Co.), 529 F.3d 432, 461
n.12, 464 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the creditor's fee claims are part of the entire claim
against the debtor); Humboldt Express, Inc. v. Wise Co. (In re Apex Express Corp.), 190 F.3d
624, 631 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting the creditors consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
upon the filing of a proof of claim); Billing, 22 F.3d at 1249 ("Langenkamp seems to formulate a
bright-line rule, holding that creditors who file proofs of claim against the estate are not entitled
to a jury trial on matters affecting the allowance of those claims.").
164. See, e.g., Germain v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323, 1327, 1329 (2d Cir. 1993); Reding-
ton v. Touche Ross & Co., 612 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1979).
165. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2617-18 (2011).
166. Id. at 2617.
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debtor's counterclaim. 1 6 7 "[A]t the outset of the claims-disallowance
process, [the court lacked] reason to believe that the process of adju-
dicating [the] proof of claim would necessarily resolve" the common-
law claims.168 Following Stern, the claims allowance process will allow
constitutional adjudication by a bankruptcy court only when ruling on
a creditor's proof of claim will necessarily resolve all the legal and
factual issues of the estate's action against the creditor.169
In the wake of Stern, at least one case has analyzed the degree of
overlap necessary to satisfy Stern's requirement of necessary resolu-
tion by the claims allowance process.170 The overlap required to be
necessarily resolved by the claims allowance process was found analo-
gous to the test applied when a defendant seeks to remove a proceed-
ing to federal court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction.171 A
plaintiff may remove a proceeding only if the plaintiff's right to relief
"necessarily depends on a question of federal law."1 72 In other words,
the plaintiff will be successful only if "every legal theory supporting
the claim requires the resolution of a federal issue."173 Applying this
test to the claims allowance process, if there is any theory that adjudi-
cates a creditor's proof of claim without completely adjudicating the
estate's counterclaim, the claims allowance process is not sufficiently
implicated.174
167. Id. (explaining that the elements of the action and availability of punitive damages for
tortious interference with an expected gift under Texas law were undecided at the time of the
bankruptcy court's judgment).
168. Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 921 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2617)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618; see Tolliver v. Bank of Am. (In re Tolliver), 464 B.R. 720, 736
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2012) (explaining that the court in Stern looked at not only the "factual overlap
of the claim resolution and the counterclaim, but also the legal elements which must be deter-
mined to resolve the claim and the counterclaim and the remedies sought by the counterclaim
and the impact on the claims allowance process"). This limitation is a significant change from
previous practices where "[c]ourts have consistently held that counterclaims and defenses filed
in an adversary proceeding seeking affirmative relief from a debtor's estate constitute[d] claims
against the bankruptcy estate that divest the defendant of the right to a jury trial" because the
claims allowance process is invoked. Gecker v. Marathon Fin. Ins. Co. (In re Auto Prof'ls, Inc.),
389 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
170. Black, Davis & Shue Agency, Inc. v. Frontier Ins. Co. in Rehab. (In re Black, Davis &
Shue Agency, Inc.), 471 BR. 381, 401-02 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012).
171. Id. at 402.
172. Id. (quoting Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. (quoting Dixon, 369 F.3d at 816).
174. Id. Other courts have been more lenient. See Spanish Palms Mktg., LLC v. Kingston (In
re Kingston), No. 11-40128-JDP, 2012 WL 632398, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Feb. 27, 2012) (noting
that issues "intricately melded" with determining proof of claim could be adjudicated pursuant
to the claims allowance process). The proper procedure for a bankruptcy court to undertake in
determining whether an action will be necessarily adjudicated is uncertain. The Sixth Circuit
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C. Beyond Stern
This Subpart considers the boundaries of the claims allowance pro-
cess beyond the answers provided by the Seventh Amendment Case
Line and Constitutional Adjudication Case Line.
1. § 502(d)
Section 502(d) eases satisfaction of the second prong of the Stern
test by requiring that certain causes of action by the estate against a
creditor will be completely adjudicated as part of ruling on the credi-
tor's proof of claim, regardless of a lack of complete factual or legal
overlap. As noted above, Stern allows a bankruptcy court to adjudi-
cate a state-law-based counterclaim against a creditor only when the
ruling on the creditor's proof of claim will dispose of all factual and
legal issues presented by the counterclaim.175 Although the avoidance
claims encompassed in § 502(d) are found in the Code, first
Schoenthall76 (§ 547 preference) and then Granfinanciera177 (fraudu-
lent conveyance) ruled that these actions are equivalent to state-law-
based actions. Section 502(d) makes the lack of complete legal and
factual overlap irrelevant because the avoidance action must be adju-
dicated before the proof of claim is allowed. Hence, the avoidance
action is necessarily resolved as part of the claims allowance process.
This power is not uncontroverted. The boundaries of § 502(d) have
never been truly defined.178 Moreover, Professor Brubaker asserts
that § 502(d) is applicable only within the traditional notions of sum-
mary jurisdiction under the 1898 Act.179 Although some evidence
supports his view, the claims allowance process in general has always
been defined by the sovereign and adjudicated by a non-Article III
tribunal. 80 Therefore, unlike other areas of bankruptcy, Congress
may reasonably define the process as it desires.
Section 502(d) currently disallows the claims of a creditor from
whom "property is recoverable under section 542, 543, 550, or 553 of
[the Code] or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section
522(f), 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of [the Code]" until
recently opined that it did not "believe that Stern requires a court to determine, in advance,
which facts will ultimately prove strictly necessary to resolve a creditor's proof of claim." Onkyo
Eur. Elecs. GmbH v. Global Technovations Inc. (In re Global Technovations Inc.), 694 F.3d 705,
722 (6th Cir. 2012).
175. See supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
176. Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1932).
177. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989).
178. See Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 155-56.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 125-26.
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the transfers are surrendered to the estate.18' According to the legis-
lative history, it "requires disallowance of a claim of a transferee of a
voidable transfer in toto if the transferee has not paid the amount or
turned over the property received as required under the sections
under which the transferee's liability arises."182 Stern's explanation of
the disallowance procedure of § 502(d) not only distinguished a pref-
erence from Vickie's counterclaim, but also reaffirmed the constitu-
tionality of the procedure itself.183 As the following sections illustrate,
§ 502(d) plays a large but ill-defined role in the claims allowance pro-
cess. However, whether it is actually part of the claims allowance pro-
cess is still uncertain.
At first glance, Katchen seems to directly support the proposition
that the claims allowance process encompasses all objections to claims
pursuant to § 502(d). The Court relied upon § 57(g), the analog to
§ 502(d) under the 1898 Act, and did not analyze the breadth of over-
lap between the estate's preference action and the creditor's proof of
claim:
Unavoidably and by the very terms of the Act, when a bankruptcy
trustee presents a [§ 57(g)] objection to a claim, the claim can
neither be allowed nor disallowed until the preference matter is ad-
judicated. The objection under [§ 57(g)] is, like other objections,
part and parcel of the allowance process and is subject to summary
adjudication by a bankruptcy court. This is the plain import of
[§ 57] and finds support in the same policy of expedition that under-
181. 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(d) (West 2006). "The twin aims of section 502(d) are to assure an
equality of distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy estate and to have the coercive effect of
insuring compliance with judicial orders." Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., LLC (In re Enron
Corp.), 379 B.R. 425, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Campbell v. United States (In re Davis), 889
F.2d 658, 661, 662 (5th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A split of authority exists
over whether a § 502(d) objection requires a prior adjudication of the avoidance action. Com-
pare Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, LP (In re Enron Corp.), 340 B.R. 180, 210
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (failing to dismiss a § 502(d) objection even though the preference had
not been adjudicated), vacated sub nom. In re Enron Corp., 379 B.R. 425, with Giuliano v. Mit-
subishi Digital Elecs. Am., Inc. (In re Ultimate Acquisition Partners, LP), No. 11-10245, 2012
WL 1556098, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. May 1, 2012) ("A debtor or trustee wishing to avail itself of
the benefits of section 502(d) must first obtain a judicial determination on the preference com-
plaint." (quoting In re Lids Corp., 260 B.R. 680, 684 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
182. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 354 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6310 (empha-
sis added). Section 502(d) states, in relevant part, that "the court shall disallow any claim of any
entity from which property is recoverable under section 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title or that
is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section 522(f), 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549,
or 724(a) of this title, unless such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any
such property, for which such entity or transferee is liable under section 522(i), 542, 543, 550,
or 553 of this title." § 502(d).
183. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011).
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lies the necessity for summary action in many other proceedings
under the Act.184
The scope of § 57(g), however, was not settled at the time Katchen
was decided, and the Court declined to rule on whether an objection
applied to all the claims of a creditor.185 In essence, can a creditor
who is liable for an avoidable transfer surrender one claim and pursue
the rest? Or, are all creditors' claims disallowed unless the preference
is paid? On the one hand, if every claim is a separate unit, creditors
will attempt to split claims, surrender the amount closest to the value
of the avoidable transfer under § 502(d), and then file the higher val-
ued claims for face value without fear of liability. 8 6 The advantage of
surrendering a single claim instead of paying the disputed funds to the
estate is that, in most cases, the creditor would not be paid in full on
its claim, a discount known as bankruptcy dollars. 87 In contrast, a
surrendered transfer would not be discounted. To stymie this strategic
behavior, the majority of courts at the time Katchen was decided
would not allow any of a creditor's claims until the entire voidable
transfer was surrendered.188 On the other hand, transactions between
the debtor and creditor may in fact be separate, and failing to separate
them can cause unfair hardship.189 Regardless of the ambiguity in the
scope of § 502(d), bankruptcy courts both before and after Stern have
found that a voidable transfer or preference, together with the defen-
dant's filing of a proof of claim, disallows all of the creditor's claims
unless and until the creditor pays or surrenders the avoidable trans-
fer.190 As Katchen explained, "the language of [§ 57(g)], it will be ob-
184. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1966).
185. Id. at 330 n.5. The Coier on Bankruptcy section cited by Katchen noted the problem
attendant to interpreting § 502(d). Id. (citing 3 LAWRENCE P. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
57.19[3.2] (14th ed. 1964)).
186. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 330-31 (citing 3 KING, supra note 185). For example, when a credi-
tor has one large claim for $1,000,000 and a looming preference action for $250,000, the creditor
would prefer to split the claim into a $740,000 and a $260,000 claim because the creditor can
surrender the $260,000 claim, forego litigation on the preference action and its accompanying
expense, and not worry about preference liability for the $740,000 claim.
187. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission's Recommendations Concerning the
Treatment of Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 466 & n.23 (1997). As
Professor Westbrook explains, the amount of discount applied dramatically influences the ra-
tional calculations of the parties. Id.; see, e.g., Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II,
LP (In re Enron Corp.), 340 B.R. 180, 189 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated sub nom. Enron
Corp. v. Springfield Assocs., LLC (In re Enron Corp.), 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
188. See Katchen, 382 U.S. at 330 n.5 (citing 3 KING, supra note 185).
189. See 3 KING, supra note 185.
190. E.g., Parker N. Am. Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Parker N. Am. Corp.), 24 F.3d
1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 1994); Glinka v. Abraham & Rose Co., No. 2:93-CV-291, 1994 WL 905714,
at *11 (D. Vt. June 6, 1994); see In re KB Toys, Inc., 470 B.R. 331, 335-36 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012);
Burns v. Dennis (In re Se. Materials, Inc.), 467 B.R. 337, 349-50 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012); West
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served, is concerned with creditors rather than claims and thus
contemplates that allowance of a claim may be conditioned on surren-
der of preferences received with respect to transactions unrelated to
the claims." 191 This is the better view. Returning to Wiswall, the Su-
preme Court has observed that Congress has set the consequences of
invoking the claims allowance process.192 The legislative history, as
noted above, further suggests that § 502(d) should halt allowance of
all the claims of a creditor until the creditor pays or surrenders the
value of the preference.193
The biggest issue with reliance on Katchen's use of § 502(d) as part
of the claims allowance process is Langenkamp's failure to cite that
section, even though it involved the same issue.194 Professor Bruba-
ker attempts to bridge this gap by finding that the Supreme Court has
constitutionalized the summary/plenary dichotomy.195 Brubaker
posits that the 1898 Act had already categorized preference and fraud-
ulent conveyance actions against a creditor as summary proceed-
ings.196 Thus, the use of § 57(g) and § 502(d) is unnecessary. When
suing a creditor for a preference, the proceeding would have been
summarily adjudicated under the 1898 Act but will now fall analo-
gously within the Constitutional Power of bankruptcy courts.197
Brubaker's analysis of § 502(d) is incomplete because he does not
consider the historical role of non-Article III tribunals in adjudicating
the claims allowance process as delineated by the legislature. Bruba-
ker correctly states that "adjudication of a preference suit against a
creditor was categorized as a summary proceeding under the 1898
Act."198 This categorization was cemented only by Katchen, however,
as "it must be conceded that the Bankruptcy Act does not in express
terms confer summary jurisdiction to order claimants to surrender
preferences." 199 Katchen held that summary jurisdiction extends to
v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy, LP), 465 B.R. 452, 464-65
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); Gugino v. Canyon Cnty. (In re Bujak), No. 10-03569-JDP, 2011 WL
5326038, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 3, 2011); In re Mid Atl. Fund, Inc., 60 B.R. 604, 609
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
191. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 330 n.5.
192. Wiswall v. Campbell, 93 U.S. 347, 350 (1876).
193. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 354 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6310.
194. The Tenth Circuit noted that § 502(d) had been applied to disallow the claims of the
creditors. Langenkamp v. Hackler (In re Republic Trust & Say. Co.), 897 F.2d 1041, 1045 n.4
(10th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990) (per curiam).
195. Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 155-56.
196. Id. at 155.
197. Id. at 168-69.
198. Id. at 155.
199. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966).
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cover a preference action against a creditor by relying on two strings
of authority, not the grant of summary jurisdiction itself. First,
Katchen relied upon pre-1898 Act cases examining the power to adju-
dicate claims through the lens of statutory construction,200 and second,
the § 57(g) analysis was "[c]ritical to the Court's decision." 201 There-
fore, one, the other, or both strains of authority were necessary to
sustain Katchen's holding.202 Brubaker cogently argues that statutory
construction decisions are now binding precedent for the constitu-
tional adjudication analysis because Stern relied upon the portions of
Katchen applying them.203 Accordingly, the codification of § 502(d) is
unnecessary and represents a red herring in the search for constitu-
tional boundaries. Professor Brubaker is aided by Stern's comment
that Vickie Marshall's counterclaim fell within the grant of statutory
jurisdiction yet could not be constitutionally adjudicated. 204 There-
fore, he reasons that the expansive jurisdiction over a category of
state-law-based counterclaims provided by § 502(d) cannot stand on
codification alone.205 If Brubaker is correct, § 502(d) may not set the
boundaries of the claims allowance process, and only what tradition-
ally encompassed the claims allowance process under the summary/
plenary dichotomy falls within bankruptcy courts' Constitutional
Power.
Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), the provision at issue in Stern,
§ 502(d), is part of the claims allowance process. Returning to Wis-
wall and Katchen, Congress has the power to delineate the claims al-
lowance process without augmentation from the public rights
exception. 206 Stern itself found that if an action is necessarily resolved
as part of the claims allowance process, it falls within a bankruptcy
200. Id. at 329-30. Brubaker correctly notes that these cases are now binding authority on the
Article III issue. Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 156-57.
201. Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 154.
202. Although Stern cites § 502(d) in its analysis of Katchen, it does not analyze whether it
was a necessary consideration. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011).
203. Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 157.
204. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 ("Although we conclude that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bank-
ruptcy Court to enter final judgment on Vickie's counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution
does not."). Stern did not limit or change the statutory jurisdiction inquiry. See also Rentas v.
Claudio (In re Garcia), 471 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012) ("In summary, when considering
their authority to issue final orders, bankruptcy courts must first consider whether they have the
statutory authority to issue a final order in a matter before them. . . . Stern v. Marshall ...
further mandates that when doing so, a bankruptcy court must first consider whether it has the
necessary statutory authority and if it does it must then consider if it has the constitutional au-
thority to finally adjudicate the dispute.").
205. See Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 176-78.
206. The public rights exception is another option for allowing § 502(d) to apply beyond its
roots in the summary/plenary dichotomy of the 1898 Act. See Ostrow, supra note 102, at 107.
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judge's Constitutional Power.207 The allowance and disallowance of
claims was within the bankruptcy commissioner's jurisdiction in En-
gland at the time of the founding,208 and it has been set forth in each
of the federal bankruptcy statutes. 209 Stern did not define the claims
allowance process because it is a statutory creation and Congress can
reasonably delineate its parameters.210 As part of the claims allow-
ance process, § 502(d) objections are within the Constitutional Power
of bankruptcy judges regardless of the historical boundaries applied
under the 1898 Act.
2. Reclamation
A creditor's claim for reclamation should invoke the claims allow-
ance process as outlined in Stern. Section 546(c) provides a seller with
a right to reclaim goods sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of
the seller's business if the debtor was insolvent when it received the
goods and the receipt of the goods occurred within forty-five days
before the petition date.211 The seller must also make a written de-
mand for the goods within certain temporal parameters. 212 If a seller
meets these requirements, the seller may reclaim the goods even when
the estate possesses an action against the seller for avoiding a fraudu-
207. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
208. "Bankruptcy is entirely a creation of statute law.... Early statutes were intended to
secure the property and assets of the bankrupt and distribute them ratably between his credi-
tors." W.J. Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the
Early Modern Period, in 69 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. PHIL. Soc'y 1, 8 (1979) (citations omit-
ted); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 479 (1800)
(noting that bankruptcy proceedings at common law "depend[ed] entirely on the [s]everal
[sitatutes of bankruptcy"); Plank, supra note 22, at 569, 574, 587-88.
209. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2006); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 57, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed
1978); Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 19, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9,
§§ 5, 10, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, §§ 2, 29, 37, 39, 2 Stat. 19
(repealed 1803); Plank, supra note 22, at 569, 606-10. Professor Ferriell makes an important
point that § 502(b)(1) necessarily applies rules of decision outside of the Code as part of the
allowance of claims. Jeffrey T. Ferriell, Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 142-43 (1989). However, Stern did not
distinguish between the rules of decision applied as part of the claims allowance process. Stern,
131 S. Ct. at 2618. Instead, we can only assume that because an action must be necessarily
resolved by the claims allowance process to satisfy that prong, the technique of looking beneath
the action should not be applied to the claims allowance process.
210. Cf 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 208, at 479 (noting that bankruptcy proceedings at com-
mon law "depend[ed] entirely on the [s]everal [s]tatutes of bankruptcy").
211. § 546(c)(1).
212. Id. § 546(c)(1)(A)-(B). The demand must be made within forty-five days of the debtor's
receipt of the goods. Id. § 546(c)(1)(A). However, if the petition date is within the forty-five
day period, the seller has twenty days following the petition date to make the demand. Id.
§ 546(c)(1)(B).
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lent transfer, preferential transfer, or post-petition transfer, or it could
invoke its strong-arm power.213
Almost eighty years before Stern, Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Co. lim-
ited the summary jurisdiction of bankruptcy referees over an estate's
counterclaims against a reclaiming seller.214 Prior to Daniel, many
courts held that a reclaiming seller's filing of a petition for reclamation
constituted consent to the bankruptcy court's summary adjudication
of all issues, including unrelated affirmative actions by the estate. 215
In Daniel, the trustee attempted to prosecute a turnover action against
the reclaiming seller that was not factually related to the reclamation
claim.216 The Supreme Court found that the referee did not have ju-
risdiction over the turnover action "unless [the reclaiming seller] by
filing its petition for reclamation entered its general appearance and
in effect consented to submit itself to summary proceedings before
that officer in respect of matters having no immediate relation to the
claim which it had presented." 217 Although Daniel employed the con-
sent rationale used prior to Katchen, reclamation easily fits within the
claims allowance process. A claim for reclamation should be treated
like a proof of claim as it seeks receipt of a portion of the bankruptcy
res, and a bankruptcy court employs the process outlined in § 546(c)
to decide whether the property is subject to reclamation. 218 Consider-
ing Stern has prescribed that an estate's action must be necessarily
adjudicated as part of ruling on a proof of claim to fit within the
claims allowance process, the same test should prescribe the necessary
degree of overlap between a reclamation claim and an action by the
estate. 219 If a state-law-based counterclaim can be adjudicated as part
of the process of ruling on the claim for reclamation, the counterclaim
would be necessarily resolved by the claims allowance process.
213. Id. § 546(c)(1). The reach of § 502(d) does not extend to reclamation claims. See id.
§ 502(d).
214. See generally Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 285 U.S. 154 (1932). Daniel also
parallels Stern in noting that efficiency is not a sufficient reason to increase the jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts. Compare Daniel, 285 U.S. at 162 (noting speedy administration is not
enough to increase jurisdiction), with Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2619-20 (explaining that courts defer to
Congress's decision to avoid encroaching on Article III judges).
215. Consent to Summary Jurisdiction, supra note 52, at 473-74 & n.38 (citing In re Barnett, 12
F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1926)); In re Pa. Coffee Co., 8 F.2d 98 (W.D. Pa. 1925).
216. Daniel, 285 U.S. at 158-59.
217. Id. at 162.
218. Rochelle & King, supra note 62, at 670 n.8.
219. Section 502(d) does not cover reclamation claims. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(d) (West 2006).
Therefore, the overlap between the estate's action and the creditor's proof of claim prescribed
by Stern must be satisfied.
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3. Setoff
Setoff invokes the claims allowance process because a creditor must
possess an allowed claim to offset its debt to the estate. 220 Similar to
reclamation, setoff's origins predate the Code and the 1898 Act.221 In
bankruptcy, setoff is governed by § 553 of the Code, which allows a
creditor to cancel a debt owed by the creditor to the estate against the
creditor's claim if both debts arose prior to the commencement of
bankruptcy and the debts are mutual.222 Mutuality is established
when the debt is "between the same parties standing in the same ca-
pacity." 223 Moreover, one further requirement is that the mutual
debts arise from extrinsic or unrelated transactions. 224 Yet, "[§] 553
does not create a right to setoff."225 Instead, the underlying state law
must allow the use of setoff rights while § 553 merely adds require-
ments that must be satisfied in order to apply the setoff rights in
bankruptcy. 226
"Strictly speaking, a set-off is not a [defense]." 227 This distinction
distinguishes setoff from recoupment and explains why setoff requires
the application of the claims allowance process while recoupment
does not. Setoff comes in two flavors: (1) if a creditor's claim is
greater than the debt owed to the estate, the setoff is considered a
counterclaim 228 and (2) if the creditor's claim is less than the debt
owed to the estate, setoff is characterized as an affirmative defense. 229
220. Id. § 553(a)(1).
221. "[T]he remedy by set-off was unknown at common law, but is a creature of the statute."
THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SET-OFF, RECOUPMENT, AND COUNTER-
CLAIM 10 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. eds., 1869). It also appeared far earlier on the equity side but it
was limited to dealings where "it appeared to have been the intention of the parties that one
debt should be set against the other." Id. at 18. The lack of common law heritage should not be
construed as indicating setoff has modern origins considering "[tihe historical antecedent of the
doctrine of setoff dates back to the Roman Empire." Campbell v. United States (In re Davis),
889 F.2d 658, 661 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989).
222. E.g., Conoco, Inc. v. Styler (In re Peterson Distrib., Inc.), 82 F.3d 956, 959 (10th Cir.
1996).
223. E.g., Farmers Home Admin. v. Buckner (In re Buckner), 218 B.R. 137, 145 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 1998).
224. United Structures of Am., Inc. v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1993).
225. Alexander & Jones v. Sovran Bank, N.A. (In re Nat Warren Contracting Co.), 905 F.2d
716, 718 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Durham v. SMI Indus. Corp., 882 F.2d 881, 883 (4th Cir. 1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
226. Express Freight Lines, Inc. v. Kelly (In re Express Freight Lines, Inc.), 130 B.R. 288, 290
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991); Elsinore Shore Assocs. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A. (In re Elsinore Shore
Assocs.), 67 B.R. 926, 942 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
227. WATERMAN, supra note 221, at 9.
228. See Styler v. Jean Bob Inc. (In re Concept Clubs, Inc.), 154 B.R. 581, 586-87 (D. Utah
1993).
229. See id.
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Regardless of the flavor, a creditor benefits from setoff because its
claim is elevated from unsecured to secured status.230 Instead of re-
ceiving a dividend from the estate in discounted bankruptcy dollars,
the creditor's claim will be paid in full to the extent the estate owes
money to the creditor.231 Because the right of setoff is derived from
state law, it arguably does not stem from the bankruptcy itself.232
A setoff's categorization within or without the claims allowance
process is more difficult as a split of authority has developed over the
issue. Led by Commercial Financial Services, Inc. v. Jones (In re Com-
mercial Financial Services, Inc.), some courts have found that a setoff
invokes the claims allowance process. When invoked by a creditor,
setoff requires a valid enforceable debt against the estate. 233 This is
true regardless of whether setoff is employed as an affirmative de-
fense or counterclaim. 234 In contrast, Styler v. Jean Bob Inc. (In re
Concept Clubs, Inc.) found the lack of necessity of a proof of claim
controlling. 235 The filing of a proof of claim is not necessary to invoke
the affirmative defense of setoff because it "only reduces, or extin-
guishes, the amount sought by the trustee for the estate." 236 Because
the creditor need not file a proof of claim to assert the affirmative
defense of setoff, In re Concept Clubs found that the claims allowance
process was not implicated.2 37
Recent cases have found In re Commercial Financial Services more
persuasive, and considering this Article's earlier analysis of reclama-
230. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 2006).
231. Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Jones (In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc.), 251 B.R. 397,
405 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2000); see also United Structures of Am., Inc. v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9
F.3d 996, 998-99 (1st Cir. 1993) (pursuant to setoff, "if Smith is in bankruptcy and Jones is
permitted to reduce his $10,000 grain debt to Smith by $5,000 because of the unpaid cottage
rental, Jones has (1) deprived the estate of $5,000 it would otherwise have had to benefit other
creditors; and (2) received full value on his $5,000 claim against Smith, even though other credi-
tors might not receive full value").
232. Ferriell, supra note 209, at 172-73; see, e.g., In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., 466
B.R. 750, 767 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012) (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011)); In
re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., 251 B.R. at 403 (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80-86 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
233. In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc., 251 B.R. at 406.
234. Id. at 406-07; see also Stoebner v. Leonard, O'Brien, Wilford, Spencer & Gale, Ltd. (In
re O'Neill), Nos. 4-95-1477, 4-97-001, 1997 WL 615661, at *3 (Bankr. D. Minn. Oct. 2,1997) (not-
ing that a creditor who is entitled to set off the amount of its claims against the amount it owes to
a debtor "has effectively received full payment on its claims instead of being limited to the
amount of the Trustee's pro rata distribution").
235. Styler v. Jean Bob Inc. (In re Concept Clubs, Inc.), 154 B.R. 581, 586-87 (D. Utah 1993).
236. Id. at 589.
237. Id.
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tion, as well as Stern's analysis, the reliance is well placed.238 The di-
rect impact of the claimed setoff on the distribution of the debtor's
assets, either as an affirmative defense or a counterclaim, implicates
the claims allowance process.239 The creditor must have an enforcea-
ble claim against the bankruptcy estate to offset his debt.240 Moreo-
ver, as noted earlier, Katchen commented that a counterclaim by the
estate, even for damages exceeding the proof of claim, does not fall
outside of the claims allowance process due to its affirmative na-
ture.241 As illustrated by the analysis of reclamation, a proof of claim
is not necessary for a party to engage in the claims allowance pro-
cess.242 Therefore, regardless of the flavor of setoff, it implicates the
claims allowance process, and a bankruptcy court may enter a final
judgment on the setoff and any estate counterclaims necessarily re-
solved by the setoff.2 4 3 Lastly, a debtor's use of state-law setoff rights,
as distinguished from a creditor's employment of § 553, requires the
application of the Stern test as a state-law-based counterclaim by the
estate cannot be finally adjudicated by the bankruptcy court unless it
is necessarily resolved by the claims allowance process. 244 Because a
setoff by definition arises from unrelated transactions, satisfaction of
the second prong of Stern it unlikely.245
238. See, e.g., Hedstrom Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (In re Hedstrom Corp.), No. 04-38543,
2006 WL 1120572, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2006); Crum v. Blixseth (In re Big Springs Realty
LLC), 430 B.R. 629, 636 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010); Elec. Mach. Enters. v. Hunt Constr. Grp. (In re
Elec. Mach. Enters.), 416 B.R. 801, 871 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009).
239. See In re Hedstrom Corp., 2006 WL 1120572, at *3. However, one should not completely
rely upon Hedstrom's analysis of In re Commercial Financial Services. Hedstrom held that any
"setoff' which had "any effect on the assets of the bankruptcy estate must be adjudicated by a
bankruptcy court." Paloian v. Geneva Seal, Inc. (In re Canopy Fin., Inc.), 471 B.R. 218, 221
(N.D. Ill. 2012). As noted by In re Canopy Financial, the In re Commercial Financial Services
court extended its holding too far by abandoning the focus on the defendant possessing a valid,
enforceable debt owed by the estate. Id.
240. Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Jones (In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc.), 251 B.R. 397,
407 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2000).
241. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337-38 (1966); see Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 60 n.14 (1989) (explaining Katchen's quote that "it makes no difference, so far as peti-
tioner's Seventh Amendment claim is concerned, whether the bankruptcy trustee urges only a
§ 57g objection or also seeks affirmative relief').
242. See supra Part IV(C)(2).
243. See Columbia Hosp. for Women Med. Ctr., Inc. v. NCRIC, Inc. (In re Columbia Hosp.
for Women Med. Ctr., Inc.), 461 B.R. 648, 657 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2011). Prior to Katchen, at least
one circuit court did not allow a bankruptcy court to summarily offset a director's proof of claim
against a permissive counterclaim. Dwyer v. Franklin (In re Majestic Radio & Television Corp.),
227 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1955). However, the Seventh Circuit's analysis is unpersuasive be-
cause it relied upon the consent rationale rather than the claims allowance process used by
Katchen. Id.
244. Somerset Props. SPE LLC v. LNR Partners, Inc. (In re Somerset Props. SPE, LLC), No.
10-09210-8-SWH, 2012 WL 3877791, at *8 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Sept. 6, 2012).
245. Id. at *8-9.
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4. Recoupment 246
In contrast to setoff, recoupment is the diminishment of the
debtor's claim against a defendant resulting from the defendant invok-
ing a defense, which arises from the same transaction that underlies
the debtor's claim.2 4 7 Recoupment, unlike setoff, is a creature of the
common law.2 4 8 It is distinguished from setoff because it is "confined
to matters arising out of, and connected with, the transaction or con-
tract upon which the suit is brought."249 An express contractual right
to recoupment is not necessary; 250 a defendant can recoup damages
from a tort against a claim of the estate from a contract.251 Recoup-
ment is available in one flavor, an affirmative defense, and any excess
balance cannot be recovered. 252 Because recoupment is derived from
the common law and is not governed by the Code, it is uncertain
whether it stems from the bankruptcy itself.2 5 3 Then-Circuit Judge
Breyer explained that codification is unnecessary "because a debtor
has, in a sense, no right to funds subject to recoupment." 254 If availa-
ble, recoupment has significant advantages compared to setoff.2 5 5 Be-
cause § 553 does not govern recoupment, its requirement that the
246. This analysis assumes that the defendant seeking recoupment has also not filed a proof of
claim. If a proof of claim had been filed, the usual claims allowance process inquiry is required
and the bankruptcy court may adjudicate the recoupment defense if it would be resolved by the
claims allowance process. See Sundale, Ltd. v. Fla. Assocs. Capital Enters., No. 11-20635-CIV,
2012 WL 488110, at *5-6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2012), affd, No. 12-11450, 2012 WL 5974125, at *4
(11th Cir. Nov. 29, 2012).
247. For other hypotheticals explaining the differences between the two doctrines see, for
example, United Structures of Am., Inc. v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 998-99 (1st Cir. 1993),
and John T. Seybert, Recoupment in the Health Care Industry-Is it Equitable?, 6 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 495 (1998). See also Ashland Petrol. Co. v. Appel (In re B & L Oil Co.), 782 F.2d
155, 157-58 (10th Cir. 1986) (canvassing various examples drawn from prior cases).
248. WATERMAN, supra note 221, at 466.
249. ALEXANDER R. TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 277 n.1 (The Richmond & Backus Co. eds., 8th ed. 1886).
250. Holford v. Powers (In re Holford), 896 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1990); In re B & L Oil Co.,
782 F.2d at 159.
251. WATERMAN, supra note 221, at 423, 444-45.
252. Rothensies v. Elec. Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299 (1946); Bull v. United States,
295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935); see also WATERMAN, supra note 221, at 466.
253. However, bankruptcy courts have so far found that they have Constitutional Power to
decide what constitutes the property of the estate as stemming from the bankruptcy itself. See
infra Part V(B)(4).
254. United Structures of Am., Inc. v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 999 (1st Cir. 1993).
255. Theoretically, the two doctrines should be mutually exclusive as either two actions are
sufficiently related to allow recoupment or they are unrelated and setoff could potentially be
used; however, courts may stretch the definition of related or unrelated to allow either of the
doctrines to apply. See 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 703 (1992) (describing the
liberal interpretation of "related" applied in In re B & L Oil Co.).
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debt arise prepetition is not applicable. 256 Hence, the defense of re-
coupment may arise post-petition.257 As a reduction of the debtor's
estate to determine its correct value, instead of a transfer, recoupment
is not subject to avoidance as a preferential transfer. 258 Additionally,
"[t]he trustee ... takes the property subject to rights of recoupment,"
and therefore, recoupment is not restrained by the automatic stay.259
A typical example of recoupment would involve a creditor who failed
to pay for a shipment of wheat from the debtor after the wheat be-
came wet due to negligence of the debtor.260 The creditor could
recoup the money spent drying out the wheat from the debt he owed
the estate for failure to pay for the shipment.261
On the spectrum spanning from counterclaims that invoke the
claims allowance process to defenses that do not, recoupment sits at
the midpoint between the ends. Unsurprisingly, courts are split over
whether recoupment is part of the claims allowance process.262 Some
courts view recoupment, which can only be raised defensively, as a
defense apart from the claims allowance process while others consider
the mitigation of payment to the estate as a distribution invoking the
claims allowance process. 263 A number of courts have found that re-
coupment should not be deemed to provide a distribution from the
estate even if the amount the trustee recovers is reduced. 264 Instead,
recoupment "ascertain[s] the true value of the estate" by justly reduc-
256. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 2006).
257. See, e.g., Ashland Petrol. Co. v. Appel (In re B & L Oil Co.), 782 F.2d 155, 156, 158 (10th
Cir. 1986) (noting that the post-petition debts of the defendant could be recouped).
258. E.g., In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium Inc., 22 B.R. 427, 433 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982),
affd sub. nom. Sapir v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Greater N.Y. (In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanita-
rium Inc.), 34 B.R. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
259. Holford v. Powers (In re Holford), 896 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Brock v.
Career Consultants, Inc. (In re Career Consultants, Inc.), 84 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. E.g., United Structures of Am., Inc. v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 998-99 (1st Cir.
1993). For other examples, see Seybert, supra note 247, at 495, and In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d
at 157-58, for an overview of examples drawn from prior cases.
261. United Structures of Am., Inc., 9 F.3d at 999.
262. Compare Paloian v. Geneva Seal, Inc. (In re Canopy Fin., Inc.), 471 B.R. 218, 223 (N.D.
Ill. 2012) (explaining that because a defendant's affirmative defense has nothing to do with a
claim against the debtor's estate, it is not part of the claims allowance process), and Container
Recycling Alliance v. Lassman, 359 B.R. 358, 365 (D. Mass. 2007) (asserting a fair accounting of
the estate is not part of the claims allowance process), with Scott v. Santander Consumer, USA,
Inc. (In re Scott), No. 12-50388, 2012 WL 3952973, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2012)
(noting that recoupment claims are part of the claims allowance process).
263. In re Canopy Fin., Inc., 471 B.R. at 223; Lassman, 359 B.R. at 365.
264. See generally In re Canopy Fin., Inc., 471 B.R. 218; Lassman, 359 B.R. 358.
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ing the estate's recovery on the transaction as a whole. 265 This view
characterizes recoupment as "essentially a defense." 266 Thus, the es-
tate "takes the property subject to the rights of recoupment," and "the
debtor has no interest in the funds" subject to those rights.267 A de-
fense to an estate's claim that, if successful, would diminish the es-
tate's property should not invoke the claims allowance process. 268 In
contrast, one bankruptcy court has recently found that recoupment is
"part and parcel of the claims allowance process." 269 It relied upon an
opinion of the Fifth Circuit, which characterized recoupment as simi-
lar to setoff because it "operates as an exception to the rule that all
unsecured creditors of a bankrupt stand on equal footing for satisfac-
tion [and] . . . sometimes allows particular creditors preference over
others." 270
The better view is that a creditor's action for recoupment does not
invoke the claims allowance process. While mutual debts are required
to apply a setoff, a defense, like recoupment, directly alters the
amount sought by the plaintiff. It must be conceded that recoupment
reduces the total value of the estate.271 Yet, its focus on determining
the just and proper liability owed to the estate on the basis of the
estate's claim, instead of obtaining a distribution from the estate, tips
the scales in favor of characterizing it as a defense and against it in-
voking the claims allowance process.272 Hence, it is better viewed as a
defense to the estate's claim, and it does not invoke the claims allow-
ance process. Additionally, a claim by the estate for recoupment
would fit within a bankruptcy court's Constitutional Power only if it
was necessarily resolved in the claims allowance process.273
265. Lassman, 359 B.R. at 364; see In re Canopy Fin., Inc., 471 B.R. at 222; Riley v. Wolverine,
Proctor & Schwartz, Ltd. (In re Wolverine, Proctor & Schwartz, LLC), 404 B.R. 1, 4 (D. Mass.
2009).
266. Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1984).
267. Holford v. Powers (In re Holford), 896 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1990).
268. Lassman, 359 B.R. at 364. But see Somerset Props. SPE LLC v. LNR Partners, Inc. (In
re Somerset Props. SPE, LLC), No. 10-09210-8-SWH, 2012 WL 3877791, at *9 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
Sept. 6, 2012).
269. Scott v. Santander Consumer, USA, Inc. (In re Scott), No. 12-50388, 2012 WL 3952973, at
*2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2012).
270. U.S. Abatement Corp. v. Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. (In re U.S. Abate-
ment Corp.), 79 F.3d 393, 398 (5th Cir. 1996).
271. Lassman, 359 B.R. at 364.
272. United Structures of Am., Inc. v. G.R.G. Eng'g, S.E., 9 F.3d 996, 998-99 (1st Cir. 1993)
(citations omitted); Lassman, 359 B.R. at 364-65; cf Crist, supra note 13, at 671-72.
273. Id. (citing In re Somerset Props. SPE, LLC, 2012 WL 3877791, at *8).
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5. Administrative Expenses
When analyzing whether the claims allowance process applies to ad-
ministrative expenses, two issues have split courts. First, whether ad-
ministrative expenses invoke the claims allowance process at all; and
second, whether § 502(d) applies to administrative expenses in the
same way it does to § 501(a) claims. Additionally, due to its unique
character, § 503(b)(9) warrants a separate analysis of the applicability
of § 502(d). In contradistinction to the § 502 claims allowance process
outlined earlier in this Part, administrative expense requests are gov-
erned by § 503, which sets forth the procedure for their allowance; a
proof of claim is explicitly unnecessary. 274 "Thus, with respect to the
allowance of claims, sections 502 and 503 are separate and indepen-
dent." 275 The majority of courts addressing this issue have agreed
with the Second Circuit and found that § 503(b) requests are not
claims within the meaning of § 501(a), the usual avenue for invoking
the claims allowance process. 276 Nevertheless, the claims allowance
process should be invoked by a request for administrative expenses
pursuant to § 503(b). 277 Whether § 502(d) should be applied to ad-
ministrative expenses is more uncertain.
Although post-Stern no published opinion has analyzed whether
§ 503(b) is part of the claims allowance process, pre-Stern courts were
split over whether a request for administrative expenses invoked the
claims allowance process. Most courts found that administrative ex-
penses should not be distinguished from § 501 claims 278 because they
"are still claims against the debtor's estate and hence seek a piece of
the res." 279
274. E.g., ASM Capital, LP v. Ames Dep't Stores, Inc. (In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc.), 582
F.3d 422, 429 n.4 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (noting that the official proof of claim form cau-
tions that it should not be used to file for an administrative expense claim which is governed by
§ 503).
275. Id. at 430.
276. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 569 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (noting the
majority rule and listing cases).
277. Cf In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 582 F.3d at 429 n.5 ("But doing business with the
reorganized debtor and filing a request for payment of administrative expenses might have other
consequences, such as waiving the vendor's right to a jury trial in any preference action initiated
by the debtor.").
278. E.g., Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P.A., 22 F.3d 1242, 1253 (3d Cir. 1994);
Roberds, Inc. v. Palliser Furniture, 291 B.R. 102, 107 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Cibro Petrol. Prods., Inc.
v. City of Albany (In re Winimo Realty Corp.), 270 B.R. 108, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); O'Neill v.
New England Rd., Inc., No. 3:99MC 309 SRU, 2000 WL 435507, at *7 (D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2000);
Simmons v. Johnson, Curney & Fields, P.C. (In re Simmons), 205 B.R. 834, 850 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1997).
279. O'Neill, 2000 WL 435507, at *7.
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In contrast, the Western District of North Carolina held that the
allowance of administrative expenses was not part of the claims allow-
ance process.280 After the defendant accounting firm sought allow-
ance of their fees as an administrative expense, the trustee
counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation,
and fraud in regard to the prepetition services 81 The defendants
sought a jury trial.28 2 Although the court admitted that the broadest
definition of claim would encompass administrative expense requests,
they were "not the sort of claims contemplated by the Code" as invok-
ing the claims allowance process.283 The court clarified that "the
Code goes further and narrows the meaning of a claim and segregates
professional 'claims' out, designating them as expenses." 284 Accord-
ingly, the fee request was not part of the claims allowance process.285
A number of reasons strongly suggest administrative expense re-
quests are part of the claims allowance process. Most importantly, the
Code defines claims as a "right to payment, whether or not such right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured,
or unsecured." 286 The breadth of this definition is not accidental as
"Congress gave the broadest possible definition to the term 'claim' in
order to ensure that all legal obligations of the debtor . . . [would] be
dealt with in the bankruptcy case." 287 This definition is sufficiently
broad to include administrative expenses, and the claims allowance
process has not been expressly limited to § 501 claims.288 Moreover,
280. Bowers v. McGladrey & Pullen (In re Fla. Hotel Props. LP), 163 B.R. 757, 759
(W.D.N.C. 1994).
281. Id. at 758.
282. Id. Although the divergence between the post-petition expenses and the prepetition ac-
tions would not have satisfied the Stern test due to the lack of a complete overlap, the district
court did not apply that analysis. Nonetheless, at least one court has generously cited In re
Florida Hotel Properties for the proposition that "the filing of an administrative claim does not
waive a right of jury trial when a party demands a jury trial in an unrelated proceeding." Lu v.
Grant (In re Sunshine Trading & Transp. Co.), 193 B.R. 752,755 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (empha-
sis added) (citing In re Fla. Hotel Props. LP, 163 B.R. 757).
283. In re Fla. Hotel Props. LP, 163 B.R. at 759.
284. Id.
285. See id.; cf Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P.A., 22 F.3d 1242, 1259 (3d Cir. 1994)
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "there is some question whether the attorneys' claim for
fees is comparable to a creditor's pre-petition claim"). Interestingly, In re Florida Hotel Proper-
ties noted that defendants may have submitted to the "administrative jurisdiction of the Bank-
ruptcy Court" when they request allowance of their fees. In re Fla. Hotel Props. LP, 163 B.R. at
759.
286. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2006).
287. Sigmon v. Royal Cake Co. (In re Cybermech, Inc.), 13 F.3d 818, 821 (4th Cir. 1994) (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
288. E.g., In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. 353, 361 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2011).
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"'claims' and 'expenses' are not mutually exclusive labels as several
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code include administrative expenses
within the claims label."289 The analysis of setoff as an affirmative
defense also teaches that a proof of claim is not necessary for an entity
to invoke the claims allowance process. The requirements and pro-
cess for allowance of administrative expenses under § 503(b) is analo-
gous to the process used to allow claims using § 502 or the process of
reclamation under § 546(c). 290 Each adjudicates whether a claimant
receives a "piece of the bankruptcy estate." 291 A request for allow-
ance of administrative expenses invokes the claims allowance process.
This Part previously detailed the impact of § 502(d) on the claims
allowance process. Whether administrative expense requests are gov-
erned by the restrictions of § 502(d) is a separate issue that presents a
triple split of authority. The majority view holds that § 502(d) is not
applicable to any § 503 requests for administrative expenses.292 The
minority view espouses the opposite view,293 while In re Circuit City
Stores applied § 502(d) to only § 503(b)(9). 2 9 4 The minority position
relies upon the inclusion of administrative expenses within the scope
of § 57(g) of the 1898 Act and the Code's retention of the same scope
in § 502(d). In Weber v. Mickelson (In re Colonial Services Co.), the
Eighth Circuit found that an administrative expense was governed by
§ 57(g) and that the expense claim would not be allowed until a pref-
erence was surrendered.295 The court's ruling relied upon two
sources. It found that the plain language of § 57(g)-"[t]he claims of
creditors who have received or acquired preferences .. . void or avoid-
able under this title, shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall
surrender such preferences"-required surrender of a voidable pref-
erence by an administrative expense claimant. 296 In delineating the
scope to § 57(g), In re Colonial Services also relied upon Irving Trust
289. Id.
290. Cf Peachtree Lane Assocs. v. Granader, 175 B.R. 232, 237 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("Resolution
of post-petition claims as with many-albeit not all-other administrative expenses are as much
a function of the bankruptcy court's equitable apportionment of the estate as resolution of pre-
petition claims.").
291. E.g., id.; Simmons v. Johnson, Curney & Fields, P.C. (In re Simmons), 205 B.R. 834, 850
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (noting that the "defendants participated in the process of allowance
and disallowance of claims by seeking and accepting payments of fees and claiming a share of
the estate as a priority creditor").
292. In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. at 361 (listing cases).
293. E.g., MicroAge, Inc. v. Viewsonic Corp. (In re MicroAge, Inc.), 291 B.R. 503 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2002); see also Movitz v. Baker (In re Triple Star Welding, Inc.), 324 B.R. 778, 794 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2005) (applying In re MicroAge).
294. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 571 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010).
295. 480 F.2d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 1973).
296. Id. at 749 (quoting § 57(g) of the 1898 Act).
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Co. v. Frimitt, which found that administrative expense claimants were
among the claimants vulnerable to § 57(g) objections. 297 Later courts
adopting the minority position have relied upon the legislative history
of § 502(d). Section 502(d) was "derived from the present law," 2 9 8
meaning § 57(g) of the 1898 Act. Without expressed intent to change
the pre-Code practice of applying § 57(g) to administrative expenses,
proponents of the minority view argue that the same parameters, as
outlined by In re Colonial Services, should apply under the Code. 2 9 9
In ASM Capital, LP v. Ames Department Stores, Inc. (In re Ames
Department Stores, Inc.), the Second Circuit disagreed with In re Co-
lonial Services and adopted the majority position, holding that
§ 502(d) was not applicable to § 503(b) administrative expenses.300 In
re Ames Department Stores examined how § 501 claims are compart-
mentalized from § 503(b) administrative expense requests with differ-
ent procedures for filing and allowance.301 Moreover, the language of
§ 502(d) strongly suggests that it applies solely to those claims that are
otherwise allowable; it only applies "[n]otwithstanding subsections (a)
and (b) of this section." 302 Section 503(b) is a mandatory provision
without exceptions: an expense that satisfies § 503(b) shall be allowed.
Unlike the quoted language making subsections (a) and (b) of § 502
subject to § 502(d), § 503 is not listed. Hence, the application of
§ 502(d) to § 503(b) creates an unnecessary conflict between two
mandatory subsections. 303 In re Ames Department Stores also found
In re Colonial Services to be "weak authority."304 The plain language
of the statute changed with the Code, and the application of § 57(g) in
Irving Trust Co. may not have even been disputed.305
Although In re Circuit City Stores applied § 502(d) to only
§ 503(b)(9), 306 its analysis was persuasively rejected by In re Mo-
297. Irving Trust Co. v. Frimitt, 1 F. Supp. 16, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
298. In re MicroAge, Inc., 291 B.R. at 508-09 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 354 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6310) (internal quotation marks omitted); S. REP. No. 95-
989, at 65 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5851, 5963, 6309-10.
299. In re MicroAge, Inc., 291 B.R. at 509.
300. 582 F.3d 422 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
301. Id. at 429-30.
302. Id. at 430.
303. Id. at 430-31.
304. Id. at 431 n.6.
305. In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 582 F.3d at 422, 431 n.6.
306. Section 503(b)(9) allows an administrative expense for "the value of any goods received
by the debtor within 20 days before the date of commencement of a case under this title in which
the goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of such debtor's business." 11
U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) (2006). This recently enacted paragraph of the Code has proven extremely
troublesome. See, e.g., Brendan M. Gage, Note, Should Congress Repeal Bankruptcy Code Sec-
tion 503(B)(9)?, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 215 (2011); Nick Sears, Comment, Defeating the
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menta.307 In re Circuit City Stores required the filing of a proof of
claim for § 503(b)(9) expense requests.3 08 It characterized § 503(b)(9)
as unique among § 503(b) administrative expenses; a proof of claim
would be required for a claimant to receive a distribution because a
§ 503(b)(9) request relates to prepetition goods received by the
debtor in the twenty days prior to the petition date. 309 Because a
proof of claim is required pursuant to § 501(a), § 502 in general, and
subsection (d) in particular, applied to the § 503(b)(9) request for ex-
penses. 310 In re Momenta disagreed by finding that a § 501(a) proof of
claim was not required. Although a claimant could file a proof of
claim under § 501(a), a request for administrative expenses does not
require the filing of a proof of claim and the employment of § 502.311
The application of the claims allowance process to administrative
expenses in general and the effect, if any, of § 502(d), are unsettled.
The better argument, as explained above, fits administrative expenses
within the claims allowance process. Determining the effect of
§ 502(d) is more difficult. Both the minority and majority positions
have compelling arguments with further policy implications beyond
the claims allowance process.312 Although a circuit court, especially
the Eighth Circuit, could reasonably rely upon In re Colonial Services
instead of In re Ames Department Stores, In re Ames Department
Stores's argument is reasonable and, as a much more recent opinion, it
is more persuasive.
6. Informal Proofs of Claim313
Informal claims are claims which lack the proper form under Bank-
ruptcy Rule 3001314 but contain sufficient substance to be deemed a
proof of claim by a bankruptcy court.315 The modern test 3 16 for infor-
Preference System: Using the Subsequent New Value Defense and Administrative Expense Claims
to "Double Dip", 28 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 593 (2012).
307. In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. 353 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2011).
308. In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., 426 B.R. 560, 570 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010).
309. Id. at 569-70 ("If a 'creditor' wishes to be granted an administrative priority
under § 503(b)(9), then the creditor must, first, file a proof of claim under § 501, second, have
the claim allowed under § 502, and then, third, request administrative expense priority under
§ 503(a).").
310. Id. at 569.
311. In re Momenta, Inc., 455 B.R. at 364.
312. See Paul R. Hage, Does § 502(d) Apply to Administrative Expenses?-The Second Circuit
Joins the Debate in In re Ames Department Stores, 18 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 6, 4 (2009).
313. Because Leslie Masterson recently chronicled many applications of the informal claims
to the claims allowance process, this Article will attempt to cover other issues untouched by her
article. See Masterson, supra note 43, at 113-14, 120-22.
314. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001.
315. Masterson, supra note 43, at 98.
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mal proofs of claim is a five-part test formulated by the Tenth Circuit
in Clark v. Valley Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (In re Reliance Equi-
ties, Inc.).317 It requires that:
1. the proof of claim must be in writing;
2. the writing must contain a demand by the creditor on the
debtor's estate;
3. the writing must express an intent to hold the debtor liable for
the debt;
4. the proof of claim must be filed with the Bankruptcy Court; and
5. based on the facts of the case, it would be equitable to allow the
amendment.3 18
Most courts have equated the filing of a counterclaim against the es-
tate seeking damages, an informal proof of claim, with the filing of a
proof of claim for purposes of invoking the claims allowance pro-
cess. 319 In contrast, Busch-Provo, Ltd. v. Sloan (In re Larsen) limited
this principle by reasoning that the claims allowance process could not
be triggered by an informal proof of claim.320 This limitation has been
roundly criticized by subsequent opinions.321 One better reasoned ex-
ception allows an informal claimant to elude the claims allowance pro-
cess when his counterclaim cannot be adjudicated by the bankruptcy
court.322 For instance, an informal proof of claim for a personal injury
tort or a wrongful death claim must be tried in a district court.323
316. For a summary of the historical origins of the informal claim doctrine, see id. at 97-98.
317. 966 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1992); see, e.g., Hefta v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
(In re Am. Classic Voyages Co.), 405 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2005) (adopting the five-part test);
Barlow v. M.J. Waterman & Assocs., Inc. (In re M.J. Waterman & Assocs., Inc.), 227 F.3d 604,
609 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); Nikoloutsos v. Nikoloutsos (In re Nikoloutsos), 199 F.3d 233, 236 (5th
Cir. 2000) (adopting the Tenth Circuit's test).
318. In re Reliance Equities, Inc., 966 F.2d at 1345.
319. See, e.g., Leshin v. Welt (In re Warmus), 276 B.R. 688, 693 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Murray v.
Richmond Steel & Welding Co. (In re Hudson), 170 B.R. 868, 874 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Peachtree
Lane Assocs., Ltd. v. Granader, 175 B.R. 232, 236-37 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Segal v. Cal. Energy Dev.
Corp., 167 B.R. 667, 672 (D. Utah 1994); Altman v. Alt. Debt Portfolios, L.P. (In re EZ Pay
Servs., Inc.), 389 B.R. 278, 287 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008); Schwinn Plan Comm. v. AFS Cycle &
Co. Ltd. (In re Schwinn Bicycle Co.), 184 B.R. 945, 953 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
320. 172 B.R. 988, 993 (D. Utah 1993).
321. See, e.g., Granader, 175 B.R. at 236 n.6; Rushton v. Phila. Forest Prods., Inc. (In re Amer-
icana Expressways, Inc.), 161 B.R. 707, 712 n.9 (D. Utah 1993); Condrey v. Endeavour Highrise,
L.P. (In re Endeavour Highrise L.P.), 425 B.R. 402, 411-13 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (listing cases
criticizing Larsen and agreeing with critiques).
322. See Control Ctr., LLC v. Lauer, 288 B.R. 269, 286 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
323. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (2006); Lauer, 288 B.R. at 286; see Germain v. Conn. Nat'l Bank,
988 F.2d 1323, 1327 (2d Cir. 1993) ("28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) requires bankruptcy litigants to try
any personal injury or wrongful death action in the district court. This strongly suggests that
these litigants are entitled to a jury trial in such an action even after a proof of claim has been
filed in bankruptcy court.").
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When analyzing informal proofs of claim, the limitations of the
Stern test apply. Many of the pre-Stern cases failed to analyze
whether the informal claim would be completely resolved in the
claims allowance process of adjudicating the informal proof of
claim.3 2 4 Stern's requirement of the necessary resolution of all legal
and factual issues as part of ruling on the informal proof of claim will
often preclude a bankruptcy court's Constitutional Power over an es-
tate's counterclaim because the necessary overlap will not exist. 325
When applicable, § 502(d) should apply to ease this requirement. 326
The Sixth Circuit recently applied the claims allowance process to
an informal proof of claim in Waldman v. Stone without specifically
identifying the creditor's counterclaim as an informal proof of
claim.3 2 7 Waldman exhibited an unusual procedural posture. The
debtor-in-possession brought a number of common-law actions
against a creditor who had not filed a proof of claim.328 The creditor
responded by filing a counterclaim seeking a judgment on his prepeti-
tion claim in lieu of filing a proof of claim. 329 The creditor's counter-
claim sought a distribution from the bankruptcy estate and therefore
triggered the claims allowance process.330 The actions of the debtor-
in-possession, which would be necessarily resolved in ruling on the
creditor's counterclaim, were within the bankruptcy court's Constitu-
tional Power.331 However, the debtor-in-possession's claims present-
ing factual or legal issues that would not be necessarily resolved by
ruling on the creditor's counterclaim were not within the bankruptcy
court's Constitutional Power.332
324. This view is known as the conversion theory. See Masterson, supra note 43, at 116 n.202,
116-17 (explaining the conversion theory and listing cases).
325. Shipley Garcia Enters., LLC v. Cureton, No. M-12-89, 2012 WL 3249544, at *10 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 7, 2012); see Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2617 (2011).
326. Cf In re Americana Expressways, Inc., 161 B.R. at 712 n.9 (noting that a turnover action
against a creditor who filed an informal proof of claim could be lodged as a counterclaim or as
an objection pursuant to § 502(d)).
327. 698 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2012).
328. Id. at 920.
329. Id.
330. Brubaker, Litigant Consent, supra note 58, at 4-5; see Waldman, 698 F.3d at 920. The
Court of Appeals distinguished a party who had not filed a proof of claim from a secured credi-
tor who is not required to file a proof of claim to retain his right to recover from the estate.
Waldman, 698 F.3d at 920. The import of this distinction is potentially troubling. Barring two
exceptions, a secured creditor does not need to file a proof of claim to protect his interest during
the pendency of a bankruptcy case. PCFS Fin. v. Spragin (In re Nowak), 586 F.3d 450, 455-56
(6th Cir. 2009). Why should a secured creditor, who has not filed a proof of claim and seeks his
lien to emerge from bankruptcy unaffected, be categorized any differently than a third party who
has not filed a proof of claim?
331. Waldman, 698 F.3d at 920-21.
332. Id. at 921.
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7. Does the Claims Allowance Process Affect the Estate?
Usually, a creditor or stranger to the estate seeks to limit the bank-
ruptcy court's Constitutional Power. 333 Nonetheless, the circuit courts
are split over the rarer issue of how to apply the claims allowance
process to the debtor or the estate. The Stern test in general, and the
claims allowance process in particular, should apply equally to the
debtor or the estate.
In In re Jensen, the Fifth Circuit extended the claims allowance pro-
cess too far in holding that "[f]iling a proof of claim denied both the
plaintiff and the defendant, the debtor, any right to jury trial that they
otherwise might have had." 334 Stern's necessarily resolved test for the
claims allowance process overrules this view as the filing of a proof of
claim is not sufficient to satisfy its second prong. The filing of a proof
of claim does not automatically grant Constitutional Power to a bank-
ruptcy judge. Only if all of the issues presented in the action are re-
solved as part of the claims allowance do either of those consequences
occur.
The Second Circuit allowed the estate to retain the right to a jury
trial when its counterclaim would not be resolved in the process of
ruling on the creditor's proof of claim.33S In Germain v. Connecticut
National Bank, the court applied a test similar to the Stern claims al-
lowance process prong to allow an estate's right to a jury trial.336 In
Germain, the trustee retained his right to a jury trial because the trus-
tee's claims were not resolved by adjudicating the defendant's proof
of claim. 3 3 7 The court also rejected the analyses applied in Jensen by
properly focusing on the overlap of the action with the claims allow-
ance process. 338
If an action is necessarily resolved as part of the claims allowance
process, the bankruptcy court should be able to finally adjudicate it
regardless of the consent of the debtor or the third party. Stern has
333. The belief that bankruptcy courts are debtor friendly and the resulting desire of adverse
parties to have the district court adjudicate causes of action probably stems from "the historical
fact that the referee's compensation was based wholly on a percentage of the amount disbursed
to creditors as dividends; every claim on which the trustee prevailed was of direct financial bene-
fit to the referee." Note, supra note 60, at 702 n.38; see M. Sobel, Inc. v. Weinstein (In re Wein-
stein), 237 B.R. 567, 574 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999); James Angell MacLachlan, Protection and
Collection of Property of Bankrupt Estates, 39 MiNN. L. REV. 626, 639 (1955).
334. 946 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1991).
335. Germain v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323, 1330 (2d Cir. 1993).
336. Id. at 1329-30.
337. Id. Although Germain does not explicitly state the necessarily resolved portion of the
Stern test, it did conclude that it "must be part of the claims-allowance process." Id. at 1330.
338. Id. at 1330. See Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P.A., 22 F.3d 1242, 1251-52 (3d
Cir. 1994) (coming to the same conclusion).
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clarified that the action must be necessarily resolved by the claims
allowance process, thereby torpedoing In re Jensen. Hence, the claims
allowance process grants a bankruptcy court Constitutional Power
over a common-law action-even if the estate does not consent-if
the action will be necessarily adjudicated as part of the claims allow-
ance process. 339 The same conclusion follows for the second prong of
the Stern test analyzed in the next part. Stern did not limit the applica-
tion of its test to third parties.340 Part VI(B)(2) will also discuss why a
debtor does not waive the right to Article III adjudication by filing a
bankruptcy petition.341 In the absence of limiting language in Stern,
"[s]urely constitutionality does not turn on the alignment of the par-
ties, that is, whether a common law cause of action is asserted by the
estate against a third party or by a third party against the estate." 342
V. STEMS FROM THE BANKRUPTCY ITSELF
Defining actions that stem from the bankruptcy itself is difficult as
Stern failed to provide any examples. 343 However, by analyzing how
Vickie Marshall's counterclaim did not fit within this prong, Stern lim-
ited the potential breadth of the prong. Providing limiting principles
is important considering "virtually anything could be justified" as
stemming from the bankruptcy itself.3 4 4 Although Stern rejected
Vickie's attempt to fit her claim within the public rights exception, 345
it left open the possibility for other portions of bankruptcy law to fit
within the exception. 346 Additionally, Stern also approved of looking
beneath a Code-based action to recharacterize it as a state-law or
common-law claim requiring Article III adjudication. 347 This Part
analyzes both the public rights exception and looking beneath an ac-
339. See Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 469 B.R. 11, 27 n.3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (Markell, J.,
concurring).
340. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011).
341. See infra Part VI(B)(2).
342. L.T. Ruth Coal Co. v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co. (In re L.T. Ruth Coal Co.), 66 B.R.
753, 794 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1986).
343. At least one court has hinted that "stems from the bankruptcy itself' does not clothe
bankruptcy courts with constitutional authority "to adjudicate disputes that closely resemble
traditional private rights disputes." West v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute
Care-Katy, L.P.), 465 B.R. 452, 457 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
344. See Lipson, supra note 29, at 612 (observing that anything could be considered part of the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations which has been rebranded by Stern as stemming from
the bankruptcy itself).
345. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618.
346. Id. at 2614 n.7.
347. Neither Stern nor Marathon required this analysis because they both involved state-law
claims existing independent of the Code. Id. at 2615.
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tion by considering how they were applied before Stern, in Stern, and
after Stern.
A. Public Rights Doctrine
Although originally applied to disputes only between individuals
and the government, the breadth of the public rights doctrine has
grown to allow Congress greater power to grant non-Article III tribu-
nals the power to adjudicate what would otherwise be actions requir-
ing Article III adjudication. 348 Congress cannot "withdraw from
judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of
a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty." 349 The public
rights exception to this rule represents the ability of Congress to en-
trust an Article I court with matters that would otherwise require Ar-
ticle III supervision, but for a waiver of sovereign immunity.350 Much
to Justice Scalia's annoyance, the public rights exception has ex-
panded into "matters of private right, that is, of the liability of one
individual to another under the law as defined."351
Justice O'Connor's majority opinions352 in Thomas v. Union Car-
bide Agricultural Products Co. 3 5 3 and Schor354 illustrate an expansive
348. Id. at 2620-21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
349. Id. at 2612 (citing Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284
(1855)).
350. Id. (citing Murray, 59 U.S. at 283-84). The other two exceptions involve cases arising in
the territories of the United States and the District of Columbia and military cases. See N.
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-66 (1982). Due to Congress's
broad powers of governance over territories pursuant to Article IV of the Constitution, see Am.
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828) (Marshall, C.J.), Article III restrictions should not
apply to bankruptcy courts located in territories outside of the mainland United States which are
properly considered Article I courts. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 547 (1962) (listing
cases). Hence, it is questionable whether the limits of the Constitutional Power of a bankruptcy
court in the districts of Guam, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico
mirror those of the other bankruptcy courts. Interestingly, one of the first Stern cases occurred
in the District of the Virgin Islands. See Springel v. Prosser (In re Innovative Commc'n Corp.),
No. 07-30012, 2011 WL 3439291 (Bankr. D.V.I. Aug. 5, 2011).
351. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2612 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50, 51 (1932)) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (noting the parameters of the public rights exception as quoted in
Crowell v. Benson); see id. at 2620-21 (Scalia, J., concurring); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 65-71 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
352. The author doubts whether Stern would have been decided 5-4 against the constitution-
ality of 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(c) if Justice O'Connor were on the Court at the time the case was
decided. Considering her opinions in Thomas and Schor, as well as her dissent in
Granfinanciera, and her joining the majority in Katz, it seems probable she would have joined
the four dissenters in upholding the constitutionality of 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(c). See Joseph
Pace, Bankruptcy as Constitutional Property: Using Statutory Entitlement Theory to Abrogate
State Sovereign Immunity, 119 YALE L.J. 1568, 1571-73 (2010).
353. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
354. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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public rights exception. The rise of the administrative agencies has led
the Supreme Court to analyze the expertise of the decision maker as a
factor in deciding whether the public rights exception applies.355 For
example, Crowell v. Benson lauded agency adjudication as a "prompt,
continuous, expert, and inexpensive method."35 6 This description
could have been transplanted from an optimistic depiction of bank-
ruptcy court proceedings.357 In Thomas, the Court pronounced a
vague test for private actions falling within the exception: "[Con-
gress's] constitutional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly
'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme . . . ."358 This practical test weighed both the congressional
intent and the benefits of Article I adjudication against the impor-
tance of Article III adjudication.359 Schor affirmed the functional test
used by Thomas and went even further to declare that the common-
law character of a counterclaim against the CFTC was not dispositive
in requiring Article III adjudication.3 60 Although Schor admitted that
the standard for finding the public rights exception applicable to a
private common-law right is high, the "limited CFTC jurisdiction over
a narrow class of common law claims as an incident to the CFTC's
primary, and unchallenged, adjudicative function does not create a
substantial threat to the separation of powers." 361 Following Thomas
and Schor, the breadth and even vitality of Marathon was ques-
tioned.362 Yet, in Stern, the Court followed the reasoning outlined in
355. Troy A. McKenzie, Getting to the Core of Stern v. Marshall- History, Expertise, and the
Separation of Powers, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23, 31 (2012). For a deep consideration of the Su-
preme Court's Article III jurisprudence in agency cases, see Thomas Merrill, Article III, Agency
Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 939, 943-44 (2011).
356. 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932).
357. E.g., Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342,346 (1874) ("It is obviously one of the purposes of the
Bankrupt law, that there should be a speedy disposition of the bankrupt's assets. This is only
second in importance to securing equality of distribution. The act is filled with provisions for
quick and summary disposal of questions arising in the progress of the case, without regard to
usual modes of trial attended by some necessary delay.").
358. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 593-94. Although at least one bankruptcy court has posited that the
Stern test is an application of Thomas's imperative, West v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex
Long Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P.), 465 B.R. 452, 460 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), one can easily
distinguish Thomas's test because it notes that it applies to "agency resolution[s]." Thomas, 473
U.S. at 594.
359. Matson, supra note 79, at 503 (summarizing Thomas).
360. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986).
361. Id. at 854.
362. Carl N. Pickerill, Note, Specialized Adjudication in an Administrative Forum: Bridging
the Gap Between Public and Private Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1605, 1642 (2007) ("While
Schor did not overrule Northern Pipeline explicitly, one must wonder whether Northern Pipeline
still has staying power.").
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Marathon and Granfinanciera by focusing on the independence of the
cause of action from the Code and ruled that Vickie's counterclaim
did not fall within the public rights exception.363
"Effectively, the federal government supplies the forum and stan-
dards for resolution of private debt matters" by a bankruptcy judge.364
This description, together with the historical analysis of bankruptcy
matters that is usually inapplicable in other public rights cases,365
helps account for the limited impact of the public rights exception in
bankruptcy cases. If the bankruptcy court were an "adjunct" to the
district court, 366 or simply an administrative agency, 367 it could consti-
tutionally adjudicate Vickie's counterclaim in Stern. Instead, Con-
gress has attempted to make bankruptcy a matter of adjudication, not
simply administration. 368 As Professor Baird recently highlighted, the
question of agency jurisdiction is a modern issue, far post-dating Mur-
ray's Lessee.369 Conversely, "the delegation of bankruptcy matters is
historical" and draws upon the eighteenth century practices used in
English courts. 370 Without the barriers of historical restrictions on ad-
judication, the adjudicative powers of modern government agencies
are more likely to fall within the public rights exception.371 These two
distinctions help explain how the counterclaim could be resolved by
the CFTC in Schor, but the bankruptcy court in Stern could not re-
solve Vickie's counterclaim. 372
Because the Supreme Court has been reluctant to analyze how the
public rights framework is implicated by bankruptcy itself,3 73 it is im-
possible to prove that a particular action fits within it. Bankruptcy
363. McKenzie, supra note 355, at 32 n.39 (listing Stern's repeated iterations of this point).
364. Susan M. Freeman & Marvin C. Ruth, The Scope of Bankruptcy Ancillary Jurisdiction
After Katz as Informed by Pre-Katz Ancillary Jurisdiction Cases, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
155, 155 (2007).
365. See Baird, supra note 12, at 15.
366. Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 158-59 (discussing the
adjunct theory and the difficulties of applying it to bankruptcy courts).
367. Professor Baird poses an interesting counterfactual analysis of the bankruptcy court as an
administrative agency. Baird, supra note 12, at 15.
368. Lipson, supra note 29, at 654.
369. Baird, supra note 12, at 15.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.; see also supra Part II(B) (discussing distinctions between the CFTC and bankruptcy
courts with regards to consent).
373. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011) (citing and quoting Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 n.11 (1989)); Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory,
supra note 8, at 172 (asserting that Stern maintained "maximum flexibility should it ever choose
to revisit the constitutionality of bankruptcy judges' adjudicatory authority. . . . [S]ome of the
potential constitutional justifications that the Court analyzed (such as the public rights doctrine
as applied to bankruptcy adjudications) likely will not stand.").
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courts have relied upon Thomas's "closely integrated" test to find that
certain elements of the Code are part of the public rights exception. 374
However, the lack of evidence for what portions of the Code, if any,
fit within the public rights exception makes any reliance on the
"closely integrated" test more conjecture than analysis.375 At least
one bankruptcy court has recently expressed skepticism over whether
the public rights exception should be applied to bankruptcy at all, con-
sidering both the Supreme Court's failure to employ the exception in
Stern or Granfinanciera and the inherent difficulties of compartmen-
talizing the exception.376
B. Looking Beneath the Action
Recharacterizing Code-based actions as common-law issues377 lim-
its the Constitutional Power of bankruptcy courts.378 Yet, Stern explic-
itly approved of the Seventh Amendment Case Line's use of this
technique to decipher whether an action seeks either "a pro rata share
374. E.g., Farooqi v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 464 B.R. 293, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011);
Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 191 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). For the most
complete analysis of the public rights exception's potential application to bankruptcy, see West v.
Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P.), 465 B.R. 452, 457-60
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
375. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615 (describing the exception as "amorphous"); see In re Clay, 35
F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The public rights/private rights dichotomy of Crowell and Murray
is a deceptively weak decisional tool."); Burtch v. Huston (In re USDigital, Inc.), 461 B.R. 276,
290 n.79 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) ("[T]he constitutional validity of the heart of the bankruptcy
courts' decision-making authority has not been resolved.").
376. Moyer v. Koloseik (In re Sutton), 470 B.R. 462, 469-73 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012).
377. Although both Stern and Marathon concerned state-law-based actions, a bankruptcy
court should also be forbidden from finally adjudicating a federal contract-law-based action.
Humboldt Express, Inc. v. Wise Co. (In re Apex Express Corp.), 190 F.3d 624, 633 (4th Cir.
1999) ("We believe, however, that the federal nature of the dispute involved is only incidental to
the question being discussed... . A pre-petition state-based contract claim and a pre-petition
federal-based contract claim stand in the same position vis-a-vis the statutory language
of § 157(b)(2) and vis-a-vis the core public rights function of bankruptcy courts."). In re Apex
Express highlights a significant problem with relying on pre-Stern precedent. Prior to Stern,
courts did not believe that a core but precluded category existed. See In re Refco Inc., 461 B.R.
at 186. Instead many courts analyzed core proceedings in light of Marathon, and any case that
came too close to Marathon's prohibition was noncore, i.e. not core but precluded. Hence, many
cases that might have been more properly adjudicated as core but precluded were simply found
to be noncore. Matson, supra note 79, at 484-85, 491 (discussing the drawbacks of finding ac-
counts receivable actions as noncore even when they should be considered turnover proceedings
which are core). Interestingly, a somewhat similar situation occurred when Katchen abandoned
the consent framework employed by lower courts. Cf Rochelle & King, supra note 62, at
681-96 (discussing the circuit court's consent-focused analysis, which became outmoded after
Katchen).
378. See Joyner v. Liprie (In re Liprie), No. 10-21281, 2012 WL 1144614, at *3 (Bankr. W.D.
La. Apr. 4, 2012).
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of the bankruptcy res" or "to augment the bankruptcy estate." 379
Reconciling the pragmatic view that Stern did not represent a seismic
shift in bankruptcy courts' Constitutional Power with Stern's approval
of this technique is difficult. Below, this Article analyzes different ap-
plications of looking beneath the action.
1. Involuntary Taking Subject to Fifth Amendment Protection
First in Meoli v. Huntington National Bank (In re Teleservices
Group),380 and as later expounded by Moyer v. Koloseik (In re Sut-
ton),381 Judge Hughes has adopted the most expansive view for look-
ing beneath the action.382 In re Teleservices Group and In re Sutton
categorized those actions, which require the involuntary taking of
property, as also requiring Article III adjudication unless the claims
allowance process will necessarily adjudicate the action.38 3 The court
suggested returning to the roots of Murray's Lessee by conflating
whether the opposing party has been deprived of the Fifth Amend-
ment right to due process with whether an action does not stem from
bankruptcy itself.3 84 In other words, "if you want authorization to
take someone else's property in the federal judicial system on account
of an ordinary debt, you need to get it from an Article III judge." 385
Hence, a court should look beneath the action and consider, "Does
this court have the constitutional authority to issue such an order on
its own? Or does the Fifth Amendment's guaranty of due process re-
quire the oversight of an independent Article III judge before that
order may enter?" 386 Although not stated directly by In re Sutton, if
an action requires the involuntary taking of property, then the action
cannot stem from the bankruptcy itself. Because each requires an in-
voluntary taking of property, neither § 542 turnover actions387 nor
379. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56
(1989)).
380. 456 B.R. 318 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
381. 470 B.R. 462 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012).
382. This view was later explained by Professor Douglas G. Baird, Baird, supra note 12, at 5,
and both views were analyzed by Judge Bailey who found them persuasive. Murphy v. Felice (In
re Felice), 480 B.R. 401, 413-15 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012); cf Tabor v. Kelly (In re Davis), No. 05-
15794-GWE, 2011 WL 5429095, at *13 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2011) (also positively citing
Judge Hughes's analysis in In re Teleservices Group).
383. In re Sutton, 470 B.R. at 472.
384. Id. at 468; In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 329-33, 337 n.61.
385. Baird, supra note 12, at 5.
386. In re Sutton, 470 B.R. at 473. Put another way, "can [an entity] be deprived of [its]
liberty, or property . . . without the exercise of the judicial power of the United States." In re
Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 330 (quoting Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. 272, 275-76 (1855)).
387. In re Sutton, 470 B.R. at 473.
[Vol. 11:1
FLESHING OUT THE SKELETON
contested orders for relief in involuntary bankruptcy 3 88 stem from the
bankruptcy itself.
In re Teleservices Group listed examples of actions that did not re-
quire Fifth Amendment due process protection, including a bank-
ruptcy court's authorization of a trustee's power to sell estate property
and its modification of the automatic stay.389 The court explained that
its ability to authorize the sale of property outside the ordinary course
of a debtor's business stemmed from the ability of Congress to pro-
vide a trustee with the power to act in these situations without bank-
ruptcy court approval.390 Although the requirement of notice and a
hearing is applicable, In re Teleservices Group asserts that the require-
ment is unnecessary because no taking of property occurred. 391 It "is
only an administrative hurdle . . . to ensure that someone other than
the trustee himself will consider the objections . . . and then decide
whether the trustee should have authority to proceed notwithstand-
ing." 392 Additionally, the imposition of or the subsequent modifica-
tion to the automatic stay does not require a taking of property, even
though it restricts access to Article III and state courts.393 So far,
Judge Hughes's and Professor Baird's views have not been widely es-
poused.394 However, were their analyses to become more popular, it
would further shake the landscape of bankruptcy courts' Constitu-
tional Power. 395
2. Fraudulent Transfers and Preferences
When analyzing the right to a jury trial, some courts have looked
beneath Code-based causes of action to decide whether the right at-
tached. The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to follow Stern's reli-
388. Id. at 473 n.38; In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 333 n.50. Under an originalist inter-
pretation of constitutional bankruptcy court jurisdiction, it is difficult to find a violation of due
process created by an order for relief in an involuntary bankruptcy. The 1800 Act, enacted while
many of the Framers were still in power, only allowed for an involuntary petition to be filed by
creditors. See Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L.
REv. 941, 941 n.1 (1979).
389. In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 333-34.
390. Murray also found that the "summary procedure used by the treasury . .. did not deprive
[the defendant] of his right to due process." Id. at 330. The court used this same rationale to
find that the court could adjudicate the allowance of claims. Id. at 336-37.
391. Id. at 334; see also Murphy v. Felice (In re Felice), 480 B.R. 401, 417-18 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2012).
392. In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R. at 334.
393. Id. at 335.
394. According to Baird, the courts have long resisted applying the "logic of Murray's
Lessee." Baird, supra note 12, at 12.
395. Lipson, supra note 29, at 612 ("[T]here is little question that bankruptcy's basic opera-
tions pass procedural muster.").
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ance upon the Seventh Amendment Case Line and look beneath
fraudulent transfers to characterize them as beyond the Constitutional
Power of bankruptcy courts, unless they are necessarily resolved by
ruling on a creditor's proof of claim. Starting with Schoenthal, the
Supreme Court has expressly embraced this analysis.396 There, the
defendant of a § 60 preference action 397 retained the right to a jury
trial.3 98 Even though the 1898 Act codified § 60 preferences, they
"constitute[d] no part of the proceedings in bankruptcy" 399 as prefer-
ences had long existed outside of bankruptcy.400 Katchen subse-
quently reaffirmed Schoenthal's holding.401 Granfinanciera equated a
preference action with a fraudulent transfer and accordingly relied on
Schoenthal's analysis to recharacterize a fraudulent transfer as a state-
law-based counterclaim.402 Langenkamp subsequently approved of
the analysis in Granfinanciera.403 Stern also approved of this analysis
when it analogized Vickie's state-law-based counterclaim to the fraud-
ulent conveyance in Granfinanciera, an action that is only state-law
based when one looks beneath the codified action.404 Many courts
have followed the Seventh Amendment Case Line as precedent for
recharacterizing §§ 544, 547, and 548 actions as state-law-based ac-
tions seeking to augment the bankruptcy estate, which require an Ar-
ticle III judge for final adjudication if they are not necessarily resolved
by the claims allowance process. 405 Broader application to other sec-
tions of the Code has been sparse. 406
In In re Bellingham, the Ninth Circuit recognized that "Stern fully
equated bankruptcy litigants' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
in federal bankruptcy proceedings with their right to proceed before
396. Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92 (1932).
397. Now, such transfers would be categorized as § 547(b) preferences.
398. Schoenthal, 287 U.S. at 97.
399. Id. at 94-95.
400. Id. at 94 n.1.
401. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336 (1966).
402. Schoenthal, 287 U.S. at 94-95.
403. Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 45 (1990) (per curiam).
404. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614, 2618 (2011).
405. E.g., Rosenberg v. Bookstein, No. 2:12-cv-00627-MMD-RJJ, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
135200, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 2012); Weisfelner v. Blavatnik (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 467
B.R. 712. 721-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld
LLP, 462 B.R. 457, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Paloian v. Am. Express Co. (In re Canopy Fin.,
Inc.), 464 B.R. 770, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Tucker v. Gibson (In re G & S Livestock Co.), No. 10-
81378-FJO-7, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 718, at *8 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Sept. 5, 2012); Burns v. Dennis (In
re Se. Materials, Inc.), 467 B.R. 337, 349-52 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012).
406. At least two pre-Stern cases support this broader application. See DuVoisin v. Anderson
(In re S. Indus. Banking Corp.), 66 B.R. 349, 356 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); L.T. Ruth Coal Co.
v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co. (In re L.T. Ruth Coal Co.), 66 B.R. 753, 792, 795-96 (Bankr. E.D.
Ky. 1986).
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an Article III judge." 4 0 7 As a result, the Seventh Amendment Case
Line inhibits bankruptcy court final adjudication of either fraudulent
transfers or preferences.408 To find either type of action to constitute
a public right would be "incoherent" considering the holdings of the
Seventh Amendment Case Line.409 Looking underneath an action to
attack whether the action stems from the bankruptcy itself is not al-
ways successful. A growing number of courts have even refused to
follow Schoenthal, Granfinanciera, and Langenkamp as precedent for
looking underneath a fraudulent conveyance or preference.410 They
focus on the limiting language of Stern and refuse to graft Schoenthal
and its progeny into the Constitutional Adjudication Case Line.411
Considering Stern's reliance upon the Seventh Amendment Case
Line, In re Bellingham's reliance upon it is natural and correct.
3. Post-Petition Transfers
Defendants have unsuccessfully tried to look beneath § 549 prefer-
ence avoidance actions to reclassify them as actions existing outside of
the Code. Courts have almost unanimously refused to look beneath
§ 549 post-petition transfer actions because they are vital to an orderly
administration of a debtor's estate and are "essentially a creditor's
remedy involving the equitable distribution of the bankrupt's es-
tate."412 Post-petition avoidance actions perform a different function
407. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553,
563 (9th Cir. 2012).
408. Id. at 562-64. Although one can make a strong argument for distinguishing a fraudulent
transfer from a preference for purposes of whether it stems from the bankruptcy itself, see West
v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P.), 465 B.R. 452, 462-64
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011), the Supreme Court's conflation of the two in Granfinanciera weakens
the argument.
409. In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d at 564.
410. See, e.g., Monette v. United States (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 462 B.R. 901, 908
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); Gugino v. Canyon Cnty. (In re Bujak), No. 10-03569, 2011 WL 5326038,
at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 3, 2011); Heller Ehrman LLP v. Arnold & Porter, LLP (In re Heller
Ehrman LLP), No. 08-32514DM, 2011 WL 4542512, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011); In re
Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 717 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
411. See, e.g., In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. at 717 (explaining that the Stern
court went to great lengths to limit the scope of its ruling).
412. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of N.C. Hosp. Ass'n Trust Fund v. Mem'l Mission Med.
Ctr., Inc. (In re N.C. Hosp. Ass'n Trust Fund), 112 B.R. 759, 762 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990); see
Parker v. Barkan & Robon Ltd. (In re Mackey), No. 09-30996, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3224, at *4
(Bankr. W.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2011) (noting In re N.C. Hospital Ass'n Trust Fund represents the
majority view). Contra Calaiaro v. Roberts (In re Roberts), 126 B.R. 678 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1991) (only case to look beneath a § 549 claim and hold that the right to a jury trial attaches).
Post-Stern, one court also found that § 549 actions are within a bankruptcy court's Constitutional
Power because they are "purely a creation of the Bankruptcy Code and [do] not otherwise exist
outside of Title 11." Springel v. Prosser (In re Innovative Commc'n Corp.), No. 07-30012, 2011
WL 3439291, at *3 (Bankr. D.V.I. Aug. 5, 2011).
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than fraudulent transfers. Section 549 actions safeguard the bank-
ruptcy estate because "[t]he allowance and disallowance of claims be-
comes [sic] meaningless if the estate is decimated [by post-petition
transfers] and there is nothing to distribute to creditors." 413 In further
contrast to prepetition avoidance actions, they do not augment the
estate and instead "restore property of the estate to the control of the
bankruptcy court for proper administration." 4 14 Hence, they are far
more likely to stem from the bankruptcy itself.
4. Estate Property
Courts have also resisted attempts to limit bankruptcy judges' Con-
stitutional Power over determining what assets constitute property of
a debtor's estate by recharacterizing the inquiry as a state-law issue.415
The determination of what constitutes property of a debtor's estate is
decided by state law.4 1 6 Yet, bankruptcy courts have roundly found
that the determination of what constitutes the property of a debtor's
estate stems from the bankruptcy itself417 because a "[c]ritical fea-
ture[] of every bankruptcy proceeding[,] ... the exercise of exclusive
jurisdiction over all of the debtor's property,"418 would be stymied. 419
However, if a court were to follow the path of Schoenthal and con-
sider whether an English bankruptcy commissioner in 1789 would
have decided the contents of the estate, the court would find that the
commissioner did not have the power to adjudicate what property was
in the estate.420 An English commissioner was clothed with the power
"to deal only with that which is the bankrupt's estate; but [had] no
power to determine what is the bankrupt's estate." 421 The courts of
413. In re N.C. Hosp. Ass'n Trust Fund, 112 B.R. at 762-63.
414. Murphy v. Felice (In re Felice), 480 B.R. 401, 428 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012).
415. E.g., Burns v. Dennis (In re Se. Materials, Inc.), 467 B.R. 337, 452-53 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
2012) ("There can be no dispute that this Court has the authority to determine what is and is not
property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate and enter final orders regarding the same."); In re
Washington Mutual, Inc., 461 B.R. 200, 217 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011); Crist, supra note 13, at 669 &
n.244.
416. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-56 (1979).
417. See, e.g., Olivie Dev. Grp. v. Park, No. C11-1691Z, 2012 WL 1536207, at *4 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 30, 2012); Velo Holdings Inc. v. Paymentech, LLC (In re Velo Holdings Inc.), 475 B.R. 367,
384 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012); BankUnited Fin. Corp. v. FDIC (In re BankUnited Fin. Corp.), 462
B.R. 885, 893-94 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
418. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 364 (2006); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v.
Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004) ("[T]he [bankruptcy] court's jurisdiction is premised on the
debtor and his estate . . . .").
419. See In re Velo Holdings Inc., 475 B.R. at 385 (determining that the estate's property is an
"essential part of administration of the bankruptcy estate").
420. Halford v. Gillow, 60 Eng. Rep. 18, 20 (Ch. 1842) (discussing eighteenth century English
bankruptcy jurisdiction); McCoid, supra note 21, at 29-31.
421. Halford, 60 Eng. Rep. at 20.
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Westminster, both in law and equity, decided the contents of the
bankrupt's estate.422 Looking beneath the codified ability of a bank-
ruptcy court to decide the composition of the estate would signifi-
cantly curtail bankruptcy courts' Constitutional Power. 423 Although it
seems likely that determining the contents of the estate would stem
from the bankruptcy itself, at least one commentator has suggested
that when state-law-based rights are adjudicated as part of determin-
ing the bankruptcy estate, an Article III judge is necessary. 424
C. Dependency and but for Causation
Does a bankruptcy court have Constitutional Power over an action
that would never have arisen without the bankruptcy case but is not
created by federal bankruptcy law? Do actions arise from the bank-
ruptcy itself because they are created by the Code, even though they
are derived from state law? These issues were created by slightly
loose wording in Stern. When distinguishing between Vickie's state-
law-based counterclaim and the preference actions in Katchen and
Langenkamp, the Court reasoned that the preference actions repre-
sented "a right of recovery created by federal bankruptcy law." 42 5
Vickie's claim, in contrast, is in no way derived from or dependent
upon bankruptcy law; it is a state-law action that exists without regard
to any bankruptcy proceeding." 4 2 6 However, Stern made clear that a
proceeding that has "some bearing on a bankruptcy case" is not suffi-
cient to stem from the bankruptcy itself.427 Thus, at least two issues
surrounding but for causation remain: (1) whether an action derived
from or depended upon a bankruptcy proceeding, but not created by
the Code, stems from the bankruptcy itself and (2) whether an action
created by bankruptcy law automatically stems from the bankruptcy
itself.
When confronted with the first issue in Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care,
Inc. (In re Ortiz), the Seventh Circuit found that even if the existence
of an action directly resulted from the bankruptcy proceeding, a bank-
ruptcy court could not finally adjudicate it if it was created by nonban-
kruptcy law.4 2 8 In In re Ortiz, the creditor, Aurora Health Care, Inc.
(Aurora), filed proofs of claim in many bankruptcy cases from 2003 to
422. McCoid, supra note 21, at 29-31.
423. Plank, supra note 22, at 615.
424. Ferriell, supra note 209, at 175.
425. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2599 (2011).
426. Id. at 2618.
427. Id.
428. Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906, 914 (7th Cir. 2011).
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2008, listing the debtors' medical information. 429 Many of the debtors
participated in two class action suits against Aurora based upon a Wis-
consin statute creating a cause of action for the disclosure of medical
records without permission. 430 The court noted that the actions were
within the core statutory jurisdiction of the Code by "arising in bank-
ruptcy" 431 because they "would have no existence outside of the bank-
ruptcy."432 However, the court found the Stern test unsatisfied. All
the factual and legal issues presented by the debtors' counterclaims
would not be adjudicated in the process of resolving Aurora's proofs
of claim.4 3 3 Moreover, the debtors' counterclaims "owe[d] [their] ex-
istence to Wisconsin state law." 434 Therefore, even though the bank-
ruptcy was the "but for" cause of the debtors' counterclaims, they did
not stem from the bankruptcy itself.435
In a situation paralleling Ortiz, the Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
trict of Delaware found that state-law claims, which arise out of ac-
tions taken in the bankruptcy case, stem from the bankruptcy itself.436
In In re American Business I and II, the Chapter 7 trustee sued the
debtor-in-possession lender for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
contract, and other state-law and bankruptcy-law causes of action. 437
The court found that regardless of the state-law basis of many of the
actions, they would not exist but for the bankruptcy case.438 The ac-
tions stemmed from the bankruptcy itself because they "relate[d] en-
tirely to matters integral to the bankruptcy case." 439
Proceedings involving § 544(b) present the second issue because it
is dependent upon the bankruptcy law, even though it is derived from
state law. The dependency of § 544(b) upon the Code is strong be-
cause it "may only be prosecuted by a bankruptcy trustee on behalf of
429. Id. at 908.
430. Id. (citing Wis. STAT. § 146.84 (2011)).
431. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2006).
432. In re Ortiz, 665 F.3d at 911 (quoting Stoe v. Flaherty, 436 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
433. Id. at 914.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Miller v. Greenwich Capital Fin. Prods., Inc. (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. II), 471 B.R.
354, 362 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).
437. Id. at 361-62; Miller v. Greenwich Capital Fin. Prods., Inc. (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs.,
Inc. I), 457 B.R. 314, 319-20 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).
438. In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. 1, 457 B.R. at 319-20 ("If not for the bankruptcy, these
claims would never exist.").
439. In re Am. Bus. Fin. Serys., Inc. II, 471 B.R. at 361-62; In re Am. Bus. Fin. Serys., Inc. I,
457 B.R. at 319-20.
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a bankruptcy estate."440 "[B]ecause a trustee and a bankruptcy estate
are strictly creatures of the Bankruptcy Code, there would be no legal
basis for this action were there no bankruptcy case."441 The trustee's
position transforms § 544(b) from an action by a creditor under state
law to provide personal benefit into an action by a representative of
the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all creditors.442 However,
§ 544(b) requires employment of the applicable state law.443 Once
again, the key analysis is whether the Seventh Amendment Case Line,
including Granfinanciera, is precedent for the right of a bankruptcy
court to adjudicate an action. Granfinanciera is precedent for a § 548
action failing to stem from the bankruptcy itself even though it has no
direct link to state law besides its historical roots.444 Consequently, a
§ 544 action, with less dependence on the Code, does not stem from
the bankruptcy itself.445
This conundrum of proceedings dependent upon the Code but in-
corporating state law also arises for § 365 executory contract dis-
putes. 4 4 6  On the one hand, the power to assume or reject an
unexpired lease is unique to the Code. On the other hand, a lease
may not be assumed unless it is unexpired, a state-law-based issue.447
Courts have relied upon the dependency of the action on the Code, as
well as the link to the bankruptcy court's ability to determine the
property of the estate,448 as reasons that the determination of whether
a debtor may assume an executory contract stems from the bank-
ruptcy itself.44 9 The ties to determining the estate's property and its
reliance on the Code for existence increase the likelihood that § 365
actions stem from the bankruptcy itself. However, the reliance on
440. Gugino v. Canyon Cnty. (In re. Bujak), No. 10-03569-JDP, 2011 WL 5326038, at *2
(Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 3, 2011).
441. Id. at *2.
442. Id. at *3. This is the crux of bankruptcy's raison d'itre, solving the common pool prob-
lem. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor's Bar-
gain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 861-62 (1982).
443. Silverman v. A-Z RX LLC (In re Allou Distribs. Inc.), No. 8-03-82321-ess, 2012 WL
6012149, at *10 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012).
444. Adelphia Recovery Trust v. FLP Grp., No. 11 Civ. 6847 (PAC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10804, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012).
445. See id. at *9.
446. Ferriell, supra note 209, at 162-65.
447. E.g., City of Valdez v. Waterkist Corp. (In re Waterkist Corp.), 775 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th
Cir. 1985).
448. Velo Holdings Inc. v. Paymentech, LLC (In re Velo Holdings Inc.), 475 B.R. 367, 387
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (property of the estate); Bustamante v. J. Moss Invs., Inc. (In re J. Moss
Invs., Inc.), No. 12-50105, 2012 WL 2150346, at *3-4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 12, 2012) (unique
nature).
449. In re Velo Holdings Inc., 475 B.R. at 387.
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state law as the rule of decision prior to the application of the Code
creates uncertainty. 450 For instance, in L. T Ruth Coal Co., Inc. v. Big
Sandy Coal & Coke Co. (In re L. T Ruth Coal Co., Inc.), 451 a well-
reasoned bankruptcy court opinion closely following the enactment of
BAFJA, the court would have held that it could not constitutionally
adjudicate a debtor's assumption of leases due to the necessity of ap-
plying the underlying state law, if that option had not been foreclosed
by a previous district court ruling.452
D. Turnover Proceedings
Although bona fide turnover proceedings should stem from the
bankruptcy itself, distinguishing such proceedings from contractual
disputes is often difficult as the line between property rights and con-
tract rights is blurry.453 A bona fide turnover action is not an action to
augment the estate; it is an action to recover property of the estate. 454
Section 542 was added to the Code to solidify the turnover power of
bankruptcy courts.455 It had hitherto been a judicial creation.456
Without the power to require turnover, administration of estate prop-
erty could be hindered by uncooperative parties possessing estate
property.457 They "essentially are proceedings that would not exist
outside of bankruptcy," 458 and looking beneath them will not reveal a
state-law-based action. In Maggio v. Zeitz, the Supreme Court sup-
ported this conclusion when it noted the similarity between turnover
and the ancient actions of detinue and replevin, but it did not equate
them because "the modern remedy does not exactly follow any of
these ancient and often overlapping procedures." 4 5 9 Maggio also re-
jected that turnover is analogous to actions for trover or conver-
sion.460 Relying on the Supreme Court's analysis, the First Circuit
450. L.T. Ruth Coal Co. v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co. (In re L.T. Ruth Coal Co.), 66 B.R.
753, 782 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1986).
451. Id.
452. Id. 795-96.
453. Ferriell, supra note 209, at 146. This argument presupposes Judge Hughes's Fifth
Amendment analysis does not apply. See supra Part V(B)(1).
454. Braunstein v. McCabe, 571 F.3d 108, 122 (1st Cir. 2009).
455. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 674 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 462 U.S. 198
(1983).
456. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1948).
457. Fulton Cnty. Silk Mills v. Irving Trust Co. (In re Lilyknit Silk Underwear Co.), 73 F.2d
52, 54 (2d Cir. 1934). This rationale mirrors the reasons § 549 actions stem from the bankruptcy
itself. See Braunstein, 571 F.3d at 123.
458. See Montana v. Goldin (In re Pegasus Gold Corp.), 394 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005);
Burns v. Dennis (In re Se. Materials, Inc.), 467 B.R. 337, 357 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012).
459. Maggio, 333 U.S. at 63.
460. Id.
[Vol. 11:1
FLESHING OUT THE SKELETON
looked beneath a turnover action and found that it should not be
recharacterized as a common-law action for trover or conversion. 461
Following Stern, courts have held that bankruptcy courts possess Con-
stitutional Power over bona fide turnover proceedings because they
allow the gathering and managing of the estate's property and thus
stem from the bankruptcy itself.462
Distinguishing bona fide turnover actions from contractual disputes
is imperative when considering whether any turnover actions should
stem from the bankruptcy itself. The differing breadths of § 542 and
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E) create a category of bona fide turnover ac-
tions that a bankruptcy court may finally adjudicate and a category
consisting of state-law-based disputes that an Article III tribunal must
finally adjudicate. 463 If the debtor is owed debts that are "matured,
payable on demand or payable on order" or a party other than the
trustee has the possession, custody, or control of property of the es-
tate, then § 542 requires turnover to the estate's representative.464
However, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E) allows a bankruptcy court to issue
final orders requiring turnover of estate property as a core proceed-
ing. Pursuant to § 541, estate property includes a debtor's right to an
account receivable or other disputed contract claim.465 Disputed con-
tract claims and accounts receivable actions naturally fit within the
definition of turnover used by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E). 466 However,
Marathon is direct precedent that a bankruptcy court cannot finally
adjudicate a state-law-based contract dispute. 467 Hence, if a bank-
ruptcy court has core jurisdiction over a disputed contract-based turn-
461. Braunstein, 571 F.3d at 121-22.
462. See In re Hernandez, 468 B.R. 396, 400 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2012); In re Se. Materials,
Inc., 467 B.R. at 357; Rentas v. Claudio (In re Garcia), 471 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012).
At least one court has mistakenly found that turnover's power to ensure "proper constitution of
the estate" satisfies the claims allowance process prong of Stern. In re Garcia, 471 B.R. at 330.
463. Ferriell, supra note 209, at 144-46.
464. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (2006).
465. Id. § 541(a); Ferriell, supra note 209, at 146. Some courts have held that this category of
claims is not a turnover claim within the core jurisdiction bestowed by 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E).
See Charter Crude Oil Co. v. Exxon Co. (In re Charter Co.), 913 F.2d 1575, 1579 (11th Cir.
1990); Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Peabody Energy Corp. (In re Coudert Bros.), No. 11 Civ.
4949(PAE), 2011 WL 7678683, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2011) (listing cases). As previously
stated, if an action is not core, it is not subject to the Stern test. See supra notes 107-11 and
accompanying text.
466. Ferriell, supra note 209, at 145; see Lovald v. Falzerano (In re Falzerano), 686 F.3d 885,
887 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012) (suggesting unjust enrichment determination as part of a § 542 final adju-
dication was potentially problematic under Stern).
467. In re Charter Co., 913 F.2d at 1579; Dayton Title Agency, Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co.
(In re Dayton Title Agency, Inc.), 264 B.R. 880, 883-84 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000); Ferriell, supra
note 209, at 145-46; cf In re Falzerano, 686 F.3d at 887 n.2 ("The bankruptcy court resolved the
merits of the Trustee's unjust enrichment claim under state law, without identifying any tangible
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over claim,468 it may fit within the ambit of the core but precluded
proceedings. Drawing the line between a contract dispute masquerad-
ing as a turnover proceeding has always been difficult.4 69
The dividing line used by the 1898 Act should not be resurrected to
help decide which turnover actions bankruptcy courts may finally ad-
judicate. Under the 1898 Act, a turnover proceeding could be summa-
rily adjudicated when the court possessed constructive possession
because a defendant lacked a substantial defense to the turnover ac-
tion.470 A plenary proceeding was required when a defendant pos-
sessed a colorable defense. 471 The dividing line between a lack of a
substantial defense and a colorable defense was very fact specific and
difficult to predict.472 Hence, it bred large amounts of litigation.473
Professor Ferriell convincingly criticized a reversion to 1898 Act stan-
dards on the grounds that "those restraints were not at all based upon
notions of what was permissible by the separation of powers doc-
trine," and instead focused on federalism. 474 A turnover action stems
from the bankruptcy itself when the state law necessary to determine
the turnover simply returns property to the estate instead of aug-
menting the estate. Actions pursuant to § 542 retrieve property of the
estate or concern uncontested debts and do not augment the estate
like some core turnover actions.475 As a result, § 542 claims should
stem from the bankruptcy itself.476
property of the bankruptcy estate at issue other than the alleged debt. This would require fur-
ther analysis to be upheld under Stern.").
468. This issue is also uncertain. Compare Burns v. Dennis (In re Se. Materials, Inc.), 467
B.R. 337, 355-56 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012), with Humboldt Express, Inc. v. Wise Co., Inc. (In re
Apex Express Corp.), 190 F.3d 624, 631-32 (4th Cir. 1999).
469. See Ferriell, supra note 209, at 145-46 ("Absent a means for distinguishing between state
contract actions of the type involved in Northern Pipeline and traditional turnover proceedings,
it is doubtful whether bankruptcy courts should be able to enter final judgments in turnover
proceedings brought pursuant to section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code.").
470. May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1925); Brubaker, Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 42, at 792; see Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1924)
(listing ways a trustee can have constructive possession).
471. May, 268 U.S. at 115-16; Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Keig (In re Prima Co.), 98 F.2d 952,
957 (7th Cir. 1938); Brubaker, Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 792.
472. Brubaker, Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 792-93, 793 n.177.
473. Id. at 792 (describing it as a "minitrial"); cf In re Eddy, 279 F. 919, 920 (W.D.N.Y. 1922)
("There must be inquiry into the merits of such a controversy. It cannot here be determined on
opposing affidavits.").
474. Ferriell, supra note 209, at 146.
475. See Rentas v. Claudio (In re Garcia), 471 B.R. 324, 328-30 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2012).
476. When a creditor has filed a proof of claim and the trustee asserts a turnover action,
§ 502(d), as outlined above, requires the adjudication of the turnover action prior to ruling on
the creditor's proof of claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2006). Hence, turnover is sometimes necessa-
rily resolved as part of the claims allowance process. See Burns v. Dennis (In re Se. Materials,
Inc.), 467 B.R. 337, 356, 357 n.29 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012).
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VI. DISCHARGEABILITY AND LIQUIDATION
Nondischargeability is an excellent place to end an analysis of the
two prongs of Stern because it involves (1) the claims allowance pro-
cess, (2) what stems from the bankruptcy itself, (3) whether to look
underneath a claim, (4) jury trial and summary/plenary issues, and (5)
even a hint of the intersection of Stern and subject matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, it also "straddles" the line between administration of the
estate and the application of judicial power.477 The determination of
nondischargeability stems from the bankruptcy itself. However,
nondischargeability proceedings often involve the more constitution-
ally suspect liquidation of the debt.478 Courts have erroneously relied
upon pre-Stern cases analyzing whether the liquidation of a nondis-
chargeable debt is core. Instead, courts should analyze Seventh
Amendment cases construing the right to a jury trial for liquidation.
Recently, a bankruptcy court has broken ranks in finding that liquida-
tion of a nondischargeable debt does not stem from the bankruptcy
itself.479 Guided by Stern and Seventh Amendment cases, courts
should employ the dischargeability allowance process. The dis-
chargeability allowance process allows liquidation of a nondischarge-
able debt within a bankruptcy court's Constitutional Power when the
factual and legal issues presented by the liquidation of the nondis-
chargeable debt are fully determined as part of the nondis-
chargeability proceeding.
A. Dischargeability
If anything truly stems from the bankruptcy itself, it is a debtor's
discharge. As both Professors Countryman and Tabb explain, dis-
charge in England prior to the founding, and in the United States
from the 1800 Act onwards, has always been a statutory remedy with
limitations and exceptions set by the sovereign.480 The classes of indi-
viduals who could receive a discharge, the actions or omissions that
could deny a debtor a discharge, as well as the types of debts excepted
477. Baird, supra note 12, at 4-5.
478. Dragisic v. Boricich (In re Boricich), 464 B.R. 335, 336-37 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011). When
a creditor has already obtained a prepetition judgment, which serves as the basis for the nondis-
chargeability claim, the bankruptcy court need not reliquidate the debt. See Morrison v. W.
Builders of Amarillo, Inc. (In re Morrison), 555 F.3d 473, 479 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009).
479. Johnson v. Weihert (In re Weihert), No. 12-10893, 2013 WL 485878, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. Feb. 6, 2013).
480. See Vern C. Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1971);
Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J.
325 (1991) [hereinafter Tabb, Evolution].
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from discharge, have all changed over the centuries,481 but the stan-
dards across all three variables have always been set by the sover-
eign.4 8 2 The increase in breadth of discharge from the original class of
involuntary merchant debtors has never been tested in the Supreme
Court. 4 83 However, while riding the circuit, Justice Catron relied
upon the sovereign power over discharge to find constitutional the
broadening of discharge to voluntary non-merchants under the 1841
Act.
[Voluntary bankruptcy] was in violation of the leading principles on
which English laws were founded. . . . But . . . [the Bankruptcy
Clause] gives the unrestricted authority to congress over the entire
subject, as the parliament of Great Britain had it, and as the sover-
eign states of this Union had it before the time when the constitu-
tion was adopted.484
Turning to the jury trial cases as precedent for the Article III issue,
only one case, decided just after the advent of dischargeability, upheld
a right to a jury trial on the issue of dischargeability.485 Subsequently,
courts have unanimously found that the right to a jury trial does not
attach.486 Neither in England at the time of the founding nor under
any federal bankruptcy statute has the right to a jury trial on the sub-ject of discharge or dischargeability been guaranteed. 487
Following Stern, courts have unanimously found that determina-
tions of dischargeability are within the Constitutional Power of bank-
ruptcy courts.488 In Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit canvassed the post-Stern case
481. The general trend has been towards a greater access to discharge with fewer acts causing
a full denial. See Countryman, supra note 480; Tabb, Evolution, supra note 480. For instance, in
England at the time of the founding in England and under the 1800 Act, only traders could
receive a discharge. Tabb, Evolution, supra note 480, at 343, 346. Not until the 1841 Act was the
requirement of employment as a trader stricken. Id. at 350.
482. Ostrow, supra note 102, at 102, 103 n.93.
483. Tabb, Evolution, supra note 480, at 351.
484. In re Klein, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 277 (1843).
485. In re Law Research Serv., Inc., No. 71-B-598 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1971); see Asa S. Herzog,
The Case for Jury Trials on the Issue of Dischargeability, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 (1972). This
result was strongly criticized. See Merrill v. Walter E. Heller & Co. of Ala. (In re Merrill), 594
F.2d 1064, 1068 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds, Garner v. Lehrer (In re Garner),
56 F.3d 677, 679 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995); Countryman, supra note 480.
486. E.g., Varney v. Varney (In re Varney), No. 94-2045, 1996 WL 138684, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar.
28, 1996) (per curiam); In re Maurice, 21 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Wachovia Bank
& Trust Co. v. Banister (In re Banister), 737 F.2d 225, 226 n.2 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Merrill, 594
F.2d at 1068, overruled on other grounds, In re Garner, 56 F.3d at 679 n.2; In re Swope, 466 F.2d
936, 938 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Schieber v. Hooper (In re Hooper),
112 B.R. 1009, 1012 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990).
487. Countryman, supra note 480, at 36-39.
488. See Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 469 B.R. 11, 20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012); Dragisic v.
Boricich (In re Boricich), 464 B.R. 335, 337 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011); Farooqi v. Carroll (In re
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law, came to the same conclusion, and overruled the debtor's objec-
tion predicated upon Stern.489 Relying on numerous post-Stern deci-
sions, the court found that the discharge is "a fundamental part of the
bankruptcy process." 490 In his concurrence, Judge Markell high-
lighted that the singular basis of discharge as a statutory right, without
a common-law or non-statutory analog, places it squarely "within
Congress's power to determine how to dispense and bestow the bene-
fit."4 9 1 The Constitutional Power of bankruptcy courts over dis-
chargeability seems uncontroversial.
B. Liquidation
The action to liquidate a nondischargeable debt is an action
"against the debtor, not against the estate." 492 Nonetheless, all the
circuit courts that have confronted the issue allow bankruptcy judges
to liquidate nondischargeable debts.493 However, the circuit courts
analyzed whether the liquidation of the nondischargeable claim was a
core proceeding, not whether it passed either prong of the Stern test.
Better precedent for the Stern analysis can be found in cases employ-
ing Seventh Amendment precedent to liquidation of nondischargeable
debts. There, the scoreboard is more equal. The reasons for allowing
blanket bankruptcy court adjudication-including waiver, administra-
tive efficiency, and even the reinstatement of the summary/plenary di-
chotomy-are unpersuasive. Although the claims allowance process
may necessarily determine some liquidations, in many cases claims are
not filed because the case is a no-asset chapter 7. In most cases where
the claims allowance process does not necessarily resolve all issues
presented by the liquidation of the nondischargeable debt, liquidation
of a nondischargeable debt should be treated like a state-law-based
action against the debtor, not an action that is necessarily resolved by
the claims allowance process or an action that stems from the bank-
ruptcy itself. However, when all factual and legal issues presented by
the liquidation would be adjudicated as part of deciding nondis-
Carroll), 464 B.R. 293, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011); Sanders v. Muhs (In re Muhs), No. 09-10564,
2011 WL 3421546, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2011).
489. In re Deitz, 469 B.R. at 20.
490. Id. (quoting In re Carroll, 464 B.R. at 312).
491. Id. at 26 (Markell, J., concurring).
492. Id. at 27 (Markell, J., concurring).
493. Islamov v. Ungar (In re Ungar), 633 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Riebesell
(In re Riebesell), 586 F.3d 782, 793-94 (10th Cir. 2009); Morrison v. W. Builders of Amarillo,
Inc. (In re Morrison), 555 F.3d 473, 478 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009); Cowen v. Kennedy (In re Ken-
nedy), 108 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 1997); Longo v. McLaren (In re McLaren), 3 F.3d 958,
965-66 (6th Cir. 1993).
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. chargeability, the dischargeability allowance process should allow
bankruptcy courts' Constitutional Power to encompass the
liquidation.
1. Core v. Related
Prior to Stern, the questions surrounding liquidation of nondis-
chargeable debts centered upon whether bankruptcy courts possessed
subject matter jurisdiction over the action.494 Because Stern held that
subject matter jurisdiction was not sufficient to overcome the obstacle
of required Article III adjudication, these cases are not direct prece-
dent for the Stern analysis. Yet, many bankruptcy courts have deter-
mined that they are bound by the applicable circuit courts'
determination that liquidating a nondischargeable debt is a core pro-
ceeding for the purposes of the Stern analysis.495 Even though the
analysis of core jurisdiction is not binding, that does not mean that no
relationship between Article III adjudication and subject matter juris-
diction exists. In his concurrence in In re Dietz, Judge Markell ex-
pressed skepticism that a bankruptcy court's Constitutional Power
extended to the common-law claim for liquidation because the grant
of statutory jurisdiction is very tenuous.496 The liquidation of the
debtor's nondischargeable debts "exist[s] independent of the bank-
ruptcy process" and therefore does not "arise in" or "arise under" the
Code.4 9 7 At best, subject matter jurisdiction is proper because the ac-
tions are "related to bankruptcy" 498 and liquidation falls within the
powers of § 105(a). 4 99 Such a questionable grant of subject matter ju-
risdiction is difficult to square with the power stemming from the
bankruptcy itself in satisfaction of Stern's first prong.5 "
494. See, e.g., Gradco Corp. v. Blankenship (In re Blankenship), 408 B.R. 854, 864 & n.6
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2009) (listing cases).
495. See In re Deitz, 469 B.R. at 22-24; In re Carroll, 464 B.R. at 312-13; Christian v. Kim (In
re Kim), No. 10-54472-C, 2011 WL 2708985, at *2 n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. July 11, 2011); cf Neves
v. Markwood Invs. Ltd. (In re Neves), No. 11-24505-CIV, 2012 WL 1831717, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May
17, 2012) (finding other circuit courts persuasive).
496. Chief Judge Jones of the Fifth Circuit admitted that the analysis employed has "relied
principally on tradition and pragmatism." In re Morrison, 555 F.3d at 479.
497. In re Deitz, 469 B.R. at 27 (Markell, J., concurring).
498. Id. (citing Brubaker, Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, supra note 42, at 914-15).
499. See Sasson v. Sokoloff (In re Sasson), 424 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the
links between dischargeability and liquidation make reliance by § 105(a) reasonable) (explaining
that it is nonjurisdictional, however, greater analysis is required); In re Deitz, 469 B.R. at 27
(Markell, J., concurring).
500. In re Deitz, 469 B.R. at 29 (Markell, J., concurring).
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2. Jury Trial
Prior to the Discharge Amendments,50 bankruptcy courts did not
determine the effect of discharge on specific claims.502 The concept of
dischargeability was unknown prior to 1970.5o3 Before the Discharge
Amendments, the process of determining the scope of discharge
started when a bankruptcy court entered a debtor's discharge. A
creditor seeking to evade the discharge could then sue the debtor on a
specific claim in state court, and the debtor could raise the discharge
as an affirmative defense. 504 The state court proceedings would then
adjudicate the effect of the discharge by adjudicating the merits of the
creditor's claim and, if necessary, liquidate the debt.50 5 If requested, a
jury trial would be used in the state court proceedings.506
The Discharge Amendments potentially allowed a bankruptcy refe-
ree to summarily liquidate a debt following a finding of nondis-
chargeability.507 If a referee determined that the claim was not
dischargeable, pursuant to § 17(c) of the 1898 Act, he was required to
"determine the remaining issues, render judgment, and make all or-
ders necessary for the enforcement thereof."508 However, the right to
a jury trial was expressly retained: "Nothing in this subdivision c shall
be deemed to affect the right of any party upon timely demand, to a
trial by jury where such right exists." 509 Although uncertainty re-
mained,510 some courts applied this protection to the liquidation of
nondischargeable claims under § 17(c)(3).511 Hence, the Fifth Circuit
and the Seventh Circuit held that, even though a debtor did not have a
right to a jury trial on the issue of dischargeability, the debtor could be
501. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, § 7(c), 84 Stat. 990, 992.
502. Merrill v. Walter E. Heller & Co. of Ala. (In re Merrill), 594 F.2d 1064, 1068 (5th Cir.
1979), overruled on other grounds, Garner v. Lehrer (In re Garner), 56 F.3d 677, 679 n.2 (5th Cir.
1995).
503. In re Copeland, 412 F. Supp. 949, 951, 953 (D. Del. 1976) (noting that a somewhat similar
practice of a "split discharge" was used prior to 1970 amendments); Countryman, supra note 480,
at 9.
504. In re Merrill, 594 F.2d at 1068, overruled on other grounds, In re Garner, 56 F.3d at 679
n.2.
505. Id.; In re Copeland, 412 F. Supp. at 952 n.5.
506. In re Merrill, 594 F.2d at 1068, overruled on other grounds, In re Garner, 56 F.3d at 679
n.2.
507. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 38(4), 30 Stat. 544, 555 (repealed in 1978 after signifi-
cant amendments).
508. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, § 7(c), 84 Stat. 990, 992.
509. Id.
510. See In re Copeland, 412 F. Supp. at 951, 953.
511. In re Merrill, 594 F.2d at 1068, overruled on other grounds, In re Garner, 56 F.3d at 679
n.2; Countryman, supra note 480, at 35. Professor Countryman was one of the principal drafters
of the 1970 amendments. In re Swope, 466 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1972).
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entitled to a jury trial for liquidation of the nondischargeable debt.512
When the Discharge Amendments were enacted, it was unsettled
whether referees could try jury cases.513 Some courts followed the
policy of the Judicial Conference of the United States that "referees in
bankruptcy should not try jury cases," including liquidation of nondis-
chargeable debts.514 Especially given the lack of evidence about con-
cern for separation of powers problems, the power of a referee to
summarily liquidate a nondischargeable debt is questionable. Accord-
ing to the legislative history, the Code did not incorporate § 17 be-
cause it was "unnecessary, in view of the comprehensive grant of
jurisdiction."5 15  Even if this legislative history evidences Congress's
desire to allow for bankruptcy court liquidation of nondischargeable
debts,516 Stern teaches that such desire does surmount Article III
infirmities.
Following the enactment of the Code, courts have split over the
availability of a jury trial for a proceeding to liquidate a nondischarge-
able debt.517 Courts finding that the right to a jury trial cannot attach
to the liquidation of nondischargeable debts have relied upon two
grounds: administrative efficiency and waiver.518  Neither is
convincing.
The administrative efficiency argument is typified by the Seventh
Circuit's dictum in N.LS. Corp. v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan).519 In re
Hallahan found "it preferable to allow bankruptcy courts ruling on the
dischargeability of a debt to adjudicate the issues of liability and dam-
ages also." 520 In re Hallahan's preference stemmed from the "cum-
bersome process" of empanelling a jury in bankruptcy court, sending
512. In re Merrill, 594 F.2d at 1068, overruled on other grounds, In re Garner, 56 F.3d at 679
n.2; In re Swope, 466 F.2d at 938, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973).
513. Countryman, supra note 480, at 42-43.
514. In re Sneider, 59 F.R.D. 391, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting that the paucity of decisions on
this issue makes it too uncertain to suggest a majority or minority view).
515. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 77 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5863; H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 363 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6319.
516. But see First Omni Bank, N.A. v. Thrall (In re Thrall), 196 B.R. 959, 965 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1996) (criticizing the view that the legislative history supports bankruptcy court jurisdiction ex-
tending to liquidation of nondischargeable debts based upon the legislative history).
517. Compare Boudle v. CMI Network, Inc., No. 07-CV-2820(CPS)(SMG), 2007 WL 3306962,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2007), and M. Sobel, Inc. v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 237 B.R. 567,
575 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999), with M C Contractors, Inc. v. Fink (In re Fink), 294 B.R. 657, 660
(W.D.N.C. 2003).
518. Cf Johnson v. Riebesell (In re Riebesell), 586 F.3d 782, 793-94 (10th Cir. 2009).
519. 936 F.2d 1496, 1508 (7th Cir. 1991); see In re Fink, 294 B.R. at 660.
520. In re Hallahan, 936 F.2d at 1508. But cf Porges v. Gruntal & Co. (In re Porges), 44 F.3d
159, 165 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1995).
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the proceeding to the district court for empanelling, or referring the
matter to state court.521
In In re Weinstein, the court persuasively analyzed why bifurcation
of a nondischargeability proceeding between a nonjury dis-
chargeability adjudication and a jury trial on liquidation was neces-
sary, even though the process would be inefficient. 522 Although the
court in In re Weinstein admitted the swiftness of liquidating the non-
dischargeable debt without a jury was tempting, it would "profoundly
slight[ ] the constitutional dimension of the Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial." 523 Like the comments at the end of the majority opin-
ion in Stern,524 the court stressed that constitutional rights should not
be overridden in the name of efficiency. 525
In its alternative holding, In re Hallahan suggested that the filing of
a petition waives a debtor's right to a jury trial on all issues.526 The
court reasoned that a debtor should not be able to seek sanctuary in
bankruptcy and then retain the right to a jury trial while creditors,
who necessarily file proofs of claim, lose their rights. 527 Hence, a
debtor who voluntarily files a bankruptcy petition waives the right to a
jury trial for all proceedings in the bankruptcy. 528 In Longo v. Mc-
Laren (In re McLaren), the Sixth Circuit subsequently adopted this
rationale and found that a debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition
"stripped him of any right to a jury trial he might otherwise have
claimed" for a nondischargeability proceeding.529 Many courts have
criticized In re Hallahan's waiver analysis.530 The Fifth Circuit com-
mented that the only effect of filing a petition "is to pass ownership
521. In re Hallahan, 936 F.2d at 1508.
522. 237 B.R. at 575.
523. Id. at 573. But cf Germain v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323, 1330 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We
will not presume that the same creditor or debtor has knowingly and willingly surrendered its
constitutional right to a jury trial for the resolution of disputes that are only incidentally related
to the bankruptcy process.").
524. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2619-20 (2011).
525. In re Weinstein, 237 B.R. at 573-74.
526. 936 F.2d at 1505.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 1505 n.10.
529. Longo v. McLaren (In re McLaren), 3 F.3d 958, 961 (6th Cir. 1993).
530. E.g., Southmark Corp. v. Coopers & Lybrand (In re Southmark Corp.), 163 F.3d 925, 935
n.16 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[Djebtor does not waive the right to a jury trial by filing a voluntary
bankruptcy case."); Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zackin, P.A., 22 F.3d 1242, 1251-52 (3d Cir.
1994); id. at 1257-58 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting); Germain v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323,
1330 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Jensen, 946 F.2d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 1991); OHC Liquidation Trust v.
Credit Suisse (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 378 B.R. 59, 70 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); Ouarles v.
Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. (In re Quarles), 294 B.R. 729, 730 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2003);
WSC, Inc. v. Home Depot, Inc. (In re WSC, Inc.), 286 B.R. 321, 332 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2002).
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and control of the claims to the estate." 531 It is not sufficient to elimi-
nate the jury trial right.532 Moreover, the filing of the petition does
not automatically start the claims allowance process, 533 much less nec-
essarily resolve all issues presented by an action.534 Lastly, In re Hal-
lahan left unanswered the obvious issue of whether an involuntary
debtor also waived all jury trial rights.535 Taking Hallahan's reasoning
one step further, one could find that creditors who join in an involun-
tary petition waive their jury trial rights. As one court explained in
finding that a creditor who filed an involuntary petition had not
waived the right to an Article III adjudication:
While the filing of a proof of claim may invoke the claims resolution
process in bankruptcy, the filing of an involuntary petition does not
do so. In no way can a petitioner be charged with anticipating all
outcomes of the filing, such that his act may be interpreted as the
knowing relinquishment of rights that might arise at a stage much
later in the involuntary bankruptcy case. 536
Similarly, a debtor does not waive all his rights to a jury trial or Arti-
cle III adjudication by simply filing a voluntary petition. 537
3. Claims Allowance Process
Stern counseled that a bankruptcy court's Constitutional Power ex-
tends only to common-law actions which must be necessarily resolved
as part of the claims allowance process. In the context of nondis-
chargeability, the bankruptcy court's ruling on the proof of claim
would have to necessarily determine all legal and factual issues arising
from the liquidation of the nondischargeable debt. The claims allow-
ance process has only limited application. In some situations, the
overlap will not be complete while in no-asset chapter 7 cases, no es-
tate will be created and the claims allowance process will be
inapplicable.
Although it would seem that adjudicating a creditor's proof of claim
and liquidating a nondischargeable debt based upon that claim would
531. In re Jensen, 946 F.2d at 373.
532. See In re Oakwood Homes Corp., 378 B.R. at 70 ("[L]egal claims are not magically con-
verted into equitable issues by their presentation to a court of equity." (quoting Ross v. Bern-
hard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
533. For instance, no estate is created when a no-asset chapter 7 is filed and a creditor follows
the trustee's instruction to not file claims.
534. Billing, 22 F.3d at 1251-52.
535. N.I.S. Corp. v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496, 1505 n.11 (7th Cir. 1991).
536. Tabor v. Kelly (In re Davis), No. 05-15794-GWE, 2011 WL 5429095, at *13 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. Oct. 5, 2011).
537. In re Southmark, 163 F.3d 925, 935 n.16 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[A] debtor does not waive the
right to a jury trial by filing a voluntary bankruptcy case.").
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always satisfy the second prong of Stern, that is not the case. As ex-
plained by First Omni Bank, N.A. v. Thrall (In re Thrall), the claims
allowance process and dischargeability are governed by separate pro-
visions of the Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure. 538 Once an objection to a claim is filed, a claim will not be
allowed if the debtor proves it is unenforceable pursuant to "any
agreement or applicable law."5 39 In contrast, the liquidation of a non-
dischargeable debt determines what portion of a debt is not dis-
charged. 540 If a creditor seeks a nondischargeability judgment on only
a portion of its proof of claim, the factual issues determined in the
claims allowance process will differ from those necessary to liquidate
the nondischargeable debt.541 Another example of the differences be-
tween the claims allowance process and liquidation of a nondischarge-
able debt arises when a party seeks post-petition interest accruing on
the nondischargeable debt.5 4 2 Section 502(b)(2) allows objections to
such interest for creditors who are not oversecured. 543 In contrast, the
interest could be part of liquidated nondischargeable debt. Thus, the
proceeding to determine whether the post-petition interest is allowed
as part of the claims allowance process requires different factual and
legal analysis than determining whether the post-petition interest is an
enforceable debt outside of bankruptcy: the analysis required for liq-
uidating the nondischargeable debt.544 The complete overlap required
by Stern will not exist. Only if the debt represented in the proof of
claim is the same as debt in the nondischargeability proceeding will
resolving the proof of claim also resolve all factual and legal issues
presented by the liquidation of the nondischargeable debt.5 4 5
Following Stern, the Eighth Circuit found that a complaint seeking
liquidation of a nondischargeable debt can be necessarily resolved as
538. 196 B.R. 959, 966 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).
539. 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(b)(1) (West 2012).
540. This was not true under the 1898 Act. Under the 1898 Act, both the allowance and
exceptions to discharge were limited by whether a debt was provable. In re Thrall, 196 B.R. at
965. The court would consider whether a debt was enforceable outside of bankruptcy and
whether it was excepted from discharge in the same proceeding. Id. Thus, "creditors [used] the
dischargeability proceeding for 'one stop shopping."' Id.
541. See id. at 967.
542. Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 469 B.R. 11, 29 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (Markell, J.,
concurring).
543. § 502(b)(2).
544. In re Deitz, 469 B.R. at 29. The other limitations codified in § 502(b) create analogous
problems. Id.
545. In the case of § 523(a)(2)(A), the Supreme Court's broad definition of debts obtained by
fraud, including attorney fees, treble damages and costs, makes it more likely that the proof of
claim debt and the nondischargeable debt will possess identical factual and legal issues. Cohen
v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 223 (1998).
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part of the claims allowance process. In Pearson Education, Inc. v.
Almgren, the court was confronted with whether a creditor who filed a
proof of claim and a nondischargeability complaint against the debtor
for willful copyright infringement retained the right to a jury trial for
the damages portion of the nondischargeability complaint.546 The
court found that the creditor's proof of claim vitiated the creditor's
right to a jury trial for liquidating the nondischargeable debt. Relying
on Stern, the court found that resolving the creditor's proof of claim
also liquidated the nondischargeable damages. 547
The claims allowance process will not apply to every nondis-
chargeability proceeding. The filing of the nondischargeability com-
plaint could be deemed an informal proof of claim that would invoke
the claims allowance process. 548 However, in a no-asset chapter 7 case
when no bankruptcy estate is created, 549 a nondischargeability com-
plaint does not invoke the claims allowance process.550
4. Stems from the Bankruptcy Itself
Looking beyond the claims allowance process, a number of post-
Stern courts have held that the liquidation of a nondischargeable claim
stems from the bankruptcy itself. Farooqi v. Carroll (In re Carroll)
held that liquidation of a nondischargeable debt fit within the public
rights exception because, in the words of Thomas, it is "closely inte-
grated" with the Code.551 Other courts have held that adjudication of
the underlying action "becomes part and parcel of the dischargeability
determination" and therefore stems from the bankruptcy itself.552
A number of potent arguments have been lodged against the liqui-
dation of nondischargeable debts stemming from the bankruptcy it-
self. The action on the underlying debt is analogous to Marathon's
and Stern's state-law-based actions because it is "a state law action
independent of the federal bankruptcy law."5 53 It "is totally unrelated
546. 685 F.3d 691, 693, 695 (8th Cir. 2012).
547. Id.
548. In re Deitz, 469 B.R. at 28 n.3 (Markell, J., concurring).
549. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(e) (allowing a trustee to notify creditors to not file claims if
it appears that there will be no dividends paid).
550. In re Deitz, 469 B.R. at 28 n.3; M. Sobel, Inc. v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 237 B.R. 567,
575 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999). Contra Heater v. Household Realty Corp. (In re Heater), 261 B.R.
145, 150 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001).
551. Farooqi v. Carroll (In re Carroll), 464 B.R. 293, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011).
552. See Stanbrough v. Valle (In re Valle), 469 B.R. 35, 43 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012). Although
Valle is a jury trial case, it uses the phrase "integral to restructuring the debtor-creditor relation-
ship," which this Article equates with "stems from the bankruptcy itself." See supra note 118.
553. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011); see In re Weinstein, 237 B.R. at 576; Ralph
Brubaker, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Enter a Money Judgment on a Nondischargeable
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to the administration of the debtor's bankruptcy estate and liquidation
of the assets of that estate." 554 Its "only significance . . . is that the
judgment creditor may be able to execute against the nonexempt por-
tion of any future earnings or acquisitions of the debtor."555 With
such limited ties, it is doubtful whether liquidation of a nondischarge-
able debt always stems from the bankruptcy itself.5 5 6 Johnson v.
Weihert (In re Weihert) recently held that a bankruptcy court's Consti-
tutional Power did not extend to liquidating a nondischargeable
debt.5 57 Echoing concerns raised by cases analyzing the Seventh
Amendment, liquidation of the nondischargeable debt did not stem
from the bankruptcy itself because "a non-dischargeable debt is not
necessary to administer the bankruptcy estate, and dischargeability
can be determined independent of liquidation."5 58
The most obvious argument for bankruptcy courts' constitutional
adjudication of the liquidation of a nondischargeable debt is the rein-
statement of the summary/plenary dichotomy. 559 Hence, if Marathon
and Stern constitutionalized the summary/plenary divide, a bank-
ruptcy court could potentially liquidate a nondischargeable debt based
upon the practices employed under the Discharge Amendments. 560
However, unlike the claims allowance process in Katchen, the consti-
tutionality of summary liquidation of a nondischargeable debt was not
tested in the crucible of the Supreme Court prior to the enactment of
the Code. Especially considering the Discharge Amendments' enact-
ment barely predated the enactment of the Code and their limits were
not well settled, it would be presumptuous that the pre-Code enact-
ment itself is sufficient. 561 Moreover, it is unclear what part, if any,
Debt: Exposing Pacor's Deficiencies and the True Supplemental Nature of Third-Party "Related
to" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 29 No. 4 BANKR. L. LETTER 1, 10 (2009) [hereinafter Brubaker,
Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction].
554. Brubaker, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, supra note 553, at 10.
555. In re Weinstein, 237 B.R. at 575.
556. Although not addressed here because it would require an article all by itself, one plausi-
ble way to find that the liquidation stems from the bankruptcy itself would be an incorporation
of Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), and Tennessee Student As-
sistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004). See West v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex
Long Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P.), 465 B.R. 452, 462-63 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011); Sanders v.
Muhs (In re Muhs), No. 09-10564, 2011 WL 3421546, at *1-2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
557. Johnson v. Weihert (In re Weihert), No. 12-10893, 2013 WL 485878, at *4 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. Feb. 6, 2013).
558. Id.
559. Brubaker, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, supra note 553, at 10.
560. Id.; Brubaker, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, supra note 8, at 173.
561. Cf In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P., 465 B.R. at 463 ("The historical under-
standing of the plenary/summary distinction informs, but does not dictate, the Court's analysis of
whether matters are integrally related to the claims adjudication process.").
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the separation of powers issue played in the enactment of the Dis-
charge Amendments.
5. Dischargeability Allowance Process
The dischargeability allowance process is comparable to the claims
allowance process as it would allow the resolution of state-law-based
actions to liquidate nondischargeable debts when all factual and legal
issues will be determined as part of adjudicating a debt's nondis-
chargeability.562 It applies the res judicata concerns of Katchen to
constitutionally allow the liquidation of a nondischargeable debt
within the framework of Stern. Stern discussed how the summary ad-
judication of the claim in Katchen, together with issue and claim pre-
clusion, made the otherwise necessary plenary suit to surrender a
preference superfluous. 563 Because the issues would be resolved in
ruling on the objection to the creditor's poof of claim, "nothing re-
mains for adjudication in a plenary suit" and such a suit "would be a
meaningless gesture." 564 This result is a consequence of the claims
allowance process, the price required of creditors who seek distribu-
tions from the debtor's estate.565 The Sixth Circuit recently applied
similar logic to affirm a bankruptcy court's Constitutional Power to
adjudicate the liabilities owed by a transferee of a fraudulent transfer
who had a partial defense of good faith.566 In the process of ruling on
the creditor's proof of claim and the trustee's accompanying fraudu-
lent transfer action, the bankruptcy court found that the assets trans-
ferred to the debtor by the creditor were worth $6.9 million.567 The
bankruptcy court also found the fraudulent transfer from the debtor
to the creditor totaled $13 million.568 The Court of Appeals found
that the bankruptcy court could then constitutionally adjudicate the
creditor's liability by subtracting the value conferred from the amount
transferred by the debtor. The simple subtraction left after resolving
the creditor's proof of claim and other issues necessarily resolved in
the claims allowance process fit within Katchen's allowance for bank-
562. Sheets v. Carter (In re Carter), No. 11-53071-JDW, 2012 WL 3440431, at *3 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. Aug. 15, 2012).
563. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011) (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 334
(1966)).
564. Id. (quoting Katchen, 382 U.S. at 334) (internal quotation marks omitted).
565. Id. (citing Katchen, 382 U.S. at 334).
566. Onkyo Eur. Elecs. GmbH v. Global Technovations Inc. (In re Global Technovations
Inc.), No. 11-1582, 2012 WL 4017386, at *14 (6th Cir. Sept. 13, 2012).
567. Id. at *4.
568. Id.
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ruptcy court determinations where "nothing remains for
adjudication." 5 6 9
The dischargeability allowance process is comparable. As noted by
Judge Markell in In re Deitz, the facts adjudicated in the dis-
chargeability proceeding in bankruptcy court often have a preclusive
effect on the later court liquidating the debt.570 In some cases, the
later suit may be unnecessary, like the plenary suit in Katchen, be-
cause all factual and legal issues will have been decided in the nondis-
chargeability suit. Analogous to the claims allowance process, the
dischargeability allowance process is a consequence of a debtor seek-
ing the protection of the bankruptcy court.57 1 The reward of a fresh
start with a full discharge is available only for the "honest but unfortu-
nate debtor." 572
However, the dischargeability allowance process should allow liqui-
dation of a nondischargeable debt only when all factual and legal is-
sues presented by the underlying state-law-based claim will be fully
adjudicated as part of deciding nondischargeability.5 73 Sheets v. Carter
(In re Carter), is the first court to hint that it may apply the dis-
chargeability allowance process to decide whether a bankruptcy court
may constitutionally liquidate a nondischargeable debt.574 It ex-
plained that a nondischargeable debt could be liquidated by a bank-
ruptcy court only when all factual and legal issues were determined in
569. Id. at *14 (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2616) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Katchen, 382 U.S. at 334).
570. Deitz v. Ford (In re Deitz), 469 B.R. 11, 28 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (Markell, J., concur-
ring) (citing Katchen, 382 U.S. at 334); see also Porges v. Gruntal & Co. (In re Porges), 44 F.3d
159, 165 (2d Cir. 1995); Stanbrough v. Valle (In re Valle), 469 B.R. 35, 43 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012)
("In the case of an unliquidated debt, the bankruptcy court must necessarily determine liability
and damages in order to establish the underlying debt. Adjudication of the underlying claim,
which arises under nonbankruptcy law, becomes part and parcel of the dischargeability determi-
nation and thus integral to restructuring the debtor-creditor relationship.").
571. The consequences argument is weaker for the dischargeability allowance process even
though at the time of the Code's enactment, the consequences of the filing of proof of claim
were found in § 57(g), just like the consequences of filing the petition were found in § 38(4).
These consequences were left out of the Code and have been subsequently added. Morrison v.
W. Builders of Amarillo, Inc. (In re Morrison), 555 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2009) ("The Bank-
ruptcy Code did not specifically codify [the adjudication of liquidations] upon its enactment in
1978 .... ); see Ferriell, supra note 209, at 154.
572. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
573. Sheets v. Carter (In re Carter), No. 11-53071-JDW, 2012 WL 3440431, at *3 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. Aug. 15, 2012); cf. In re Global Technovations Inc., 2012 WL 4017386, at *14 ("Stern cited
with approval the Court's prior precedent holding that a bankruptcy court may award affirma-
tive relief to a debtor after its creditor's proof of claim has been resolved and where nothing
remains for adjudication." (quoting Katchen, 382 U.S. at 334) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
574. In re Carter, 2012 WL 3440431, at *3.
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the process of deciding whether the debt was nondischargeable.575
Other courts should follow its lead as the dischargeability allowance
process tracks the teachings of Stern and Katchen to allow bankruptcy
courts the Constitutional Power to liquidate a nondischargeable debt
if all legal and factual issues will be determined in the process of de-
ciding nondischargeability, even when the claims allowance process is
not implicated.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although Stern potentially limits bankruptcy courts' Constitutional
Power over many actions, without guidance on when its test should be
applied, judges, practitioners, and commentators are left to hypothe-
size its limits. In Granfinanciera, the Supreme Court stated that it will
provide answers for only the questions before it, instead of deciding
every constitutional issue posed by the Reform Act and BAFJA.576
Therefore, it appears that without congressional intervention, many
years of litigation over the boundaries of the claims allowance process
and what stems from the bankruptcy itself will ensue. In the
meantime, the Seventh Amendment Case Line should be considered
part of the Constitutional Adjudication Case Line, and courts should
be wary of relying too heavily on the summary/plenary dichotomy.
The relationship between Stern and discharge, specifically the liquida-
tion of nondischargeable debt, should be further analyzed. The dis-
chargeability allowance process profiled in this Article attempts to
marry the concerns of Stern with the unique nature of discharge. Re-
gardless, further detailed analysis of both prongs of the Stern test is
necessary.
575. Id. The court further explained that the debtor's waiver of discharge would mean "the
state law claims will no longer be decided in the process of determining dischargeability of those
claims." Id.
576. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 64 n.19 (1989).
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